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Back when The Chicago Community Trust signed on as a partner with the Chicago Metropolitan Agency  
for Planning in January 2008 to support and actively engage in the development of the GO TO 2040  
comprehensive regional plan for the Chicago area, no one anticipated the magnitude of the Great  
Recession that has resulted in the loss of over seven million jobs nationally and almost half a million in  
the Chicago region alone. The job losses have led to other crises, including foreclosures and reduction 
of public services affecting the economic security and safety net of thousands of individuals and families 
in our region. Consequently, creating a road map to strengthen the regional economy and position the 
Chicago region to be more economically successful has become even more urgent as the major goal for the 
development of the GO TO 2040 plan.
Recognizing the importance of the GO TO 2040 plan for the Chicago region’s economic recovery, the  
Trust commissioned RW Ventures to conduct an assessment of the economic impacts of GO TO 2040.  
RW Ventures was selected because of its expertise in developing market-based strategies for regional 
and community economic development. For the last three years, RW Ventures has been working with the 
Brookings Institution to develop regional business plans and promote federal policies which can be more 
supportive of regions, the economic engines of our nation today. The co-authors of this report have deep 
experience and roots in the Chicago region. Robert Weissbourd founded RW Ventures, is a Nonresident 
Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program where he works on the Metropolitan 
Economy Project, and has been active for over 25 years in local and national economic development work. 
Gretchen Kosarko, senior associate, previously served as the Director of Research for World Business  
Chicago and a Project Manager for S. B. Friedman & Company, a Chicago-based real estate and urban  
planning consulting firm. 
The Trust is pleased that this Economic Impacts of GO TO 2040 report confirms the important economic 
values of the plan. For over 95 years, The Chicago Community Trust has worked with donors, non-profit  
organizations and public agencies to improve quality of life for our communities’ residents. We hope  
readers of this report will join The Chicago Community Trust and the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for  
Planning in our effort to implement the GO TO 2040 Plan recommendations. The Plan strengthens the  
development of the Chicago region as a major global economic center. Available at www.cmap.illinois.
gov/2040, the Plan strengthens the development of the Chicago region as a major global economic center. 
Ngoan Le 
Vice President of Program 
The Chicago Community Trust
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This report applies an economic lens to the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning’s GO TO 2040 Plan, 
exploring how its recommendations can be anticipated to influence performance of the regional economy.
Over the last several years, CMAP has performed an enormous amount of work in crafting the plan, 
supplementing in-house resources with third-party expertise on key policy areas. The plan is informed by 
extensive research, including over 50 background reports, as well as by a far-reaching, inclusive visioning 
process that engaged thousands of citizens and leaders. This report is built upon, and would not have been 
possible without, this foundational work which gave rise to the plan. We are grateful for all of that work, 
much of which is cited throughout this report, and to those who did it.  
Special thanks to CMAP and its Board for all of their extraordinary work, and for supporting this project. 
Key leadership of CMAP participated in the development of this report. Randy Blankenhorn and Bob Dean 
provided critical guidance on the Plan’s vision and intent, as well as valuable feedback throughout. Brett 
Baden offered invaluable advice for the research and analysis conducted by our team. The whole CMAP 
team generously provided key data and information needed for our independent review of the GO TO 2040 
Plan. We appreciate the active engagement of CMAP leadership to insure that this report is well informed by 
the work of the GO TO 2040 Plan. 
The Chicago Community Trust, our region’s community foundation, and particularly Terry Mazany, Presi-
dent and CEO, and Ngoan Le, Vice President, have been key supporters of CMAP, of development of GO TO 
2040 and of this project. This includes the critical and generous financial support without which none of 
this work can get done. More importantly, it includes the vision, guidance, organizing and advocacy which 
inform and elevate the work and ultimately drive its success. The Chicago Community Trust has long been 
— and continues to be — an ardent supporter of development initiatives at the neighborhood and regional 
level, for which we and the larger economic development community are extremely grateful.
A host of researchers assisted with literature reviews and otherwise provided drafting, input and comments 
for sections of the report.  We are grateful to Peter Plastrik, Joseph Grant, Rebecca Solomon, Emily Metz, 
Michael Ford, Sophie Cohen and Sohair Omar for their insights and enormous contributions.
Very substantial parts of the framework and analysis about regional economies included in this report — 
including particularly the identification and analysis of key leverage points for regional economic growth 
— were and continue to be developed jointly with our colleagues at the Brookings Institution’s Metropolitan 
Policy Program, particularly working on a national project on “regional business planning.” Beyond these 
project-specific contributions to this report, Brookings has long provided extraordinary leadership in the 
realm of metropolitan development, dramatically advancing the field in both the academic and policy are-
nas. We are particularly grateful to Bruce Katz, Amy Liu, Mark Muro and Sarah Rahman — all extraordinarily 
committed and talented contributors to the field of regional economic development. 
We have the good fortune of working closely with colleagues at the George Washington University Institute 
of Public Policy on a distinct project on regional economies, aspects of which have informed this project. 
The spatial efficiency chapter in particular draws heavily on the work of that project, and we have benefited 
greatly from their insights on the topics of clusters, governance and the dynamics of regional economic 
growth. Our special thanks go to Hal Wolman, Andrea Sarzynski, Alice Levy and Diana Hincapie. We are also 
very grateful to the Surdna Foundation for its intellectual leadership and financial support for that project.
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Executive Summary
The economy of the Chicago metropolitan region has reached a 
critical juncture. On the one hand, Chicagoland is currently a highly 
successful global region with extraordinary assets and outputs. The 
region successfully made the transition in the 1980s and 1990s from 
a primarily industrial to a knowledge and service-based economy.  
It has high levels of human capital, with strong concentrations in 
information-sector industries and knowledge-based functional 
clusters — a headquarters region with thriving finance, business 
services, law, IT and emerging bioscience, advanced manufacturing 
and similar high-growth sectors. It combines multiple deep areas of 
specialization, providing the resilience that comes from economic 
diversity.  It is home to the abundant quality-of-life amenities that 
flow from business and household prosperity.
On the other hand, beneath this static portrait of our strengths lie 
disturbing signs of a potential loss of momentum. Trends in the last 
decade reveal slowing rates, compared to other regions, of growth in 
productivity and gross metropolitan product. Trends in innovation, 
new firm creation and employment are comparably lagging.  The 
region also faces emerging challenges with respect to both spatial 
efficiency and governance.
In this context, the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning 
(CMAP) has just released GO TO 2040, its comprehensive, long-term 
plan for the Chicago metropolitan area. The plan contains recom-
mendations aimed at shaping a wide range of regional characteris-
tics over the next 30 years, during which time more than 2 million 
new residents are anticipated. Among the chief goals of GO TO 2040 
are increasing the region’s long-term economic prosperity, sustain-
ing a high quality of life for the region’s current and future residents 
and making the most effective use of public investments. To this 
end, the plan addresses a broad scope of interrelated issues which, 
in aggregate, will shape the long-term physical, economic, institu-
tional and social character of the region.
This report by RW Ventures, LLC is an independent assessment of the 
plan from a purely economic perspective, addressing the impacts 
that GO TO 2040’s recommendations can be expected to have on the 
future of the regional economy. The assessment begins by describ-
ing how implementation of GO TO 2040’s recommendations would  
affect the economic landscape of the region; reviews economic 
research and practice about the factors that influence regional eco-
nomic growth; and, given both of these, articulates and illustrates 
the likely economic impacts that will flow from implementation of 
the plan. In the course of reviewing the economic implications of 
the plan, the assessment also provides recommendations of further 
steps, as the plan is implemented, for increasing its positive impact 
on economic growth.
Summary of GO TO 2040
 
GO TO 2040 is the culmination of over three years of public outreach, 
research, analysis and consensus building. This process resulted 
in extensive recommendations, each containing a series of specific 
implementation actions directed to a variety of organizations, meant 
to respond to the major challenges and opportunities facing the 
region. The plan seeks to address immediate concerns, such as the 
economic slowdown and its fiscal impacts, as well as long-term is-
sues, such as continued population growth, demographic shifts and 
increasing scarcity of natural resources.
Implementation of the recommendations detailed in GO TO 2040 will 
change the characteristics of the region that affect economic growth 
— the “regional economic landscape” — in five principal areas:
	 •		 Transportation infrastructure  
The recommendations in the “Regional Mobility” chapter pri-
oritize investments in the region’s roads, freight rail and transit 
system, streamlining the movement of goods and people within 
and through the region. The implementation actions reflect two 
key principles for prioritizing investments throughout the re-
gion: “fix it first,” which emphasizes investment in already-de-
veloped (versus undeveloped) areas; and “do no harm,” which 
focuses attention on mitigating incentives for an unsustainable 
pattern of development.
	 •			Built environment  
The recommendations in the “Livable Communities” chapter 
address enhancing the “livability” of the region’s communities, 
with an emphasis on reinvestment, density, diversity of uses 
and income levels, walkability, access to transit, environmental 
integrity, smart design and development that fits each local 
context.
	 •		 Labor force and firms  
Recommendations in the “Human Capital” chapter support 
development of a skilled workforce better matched to emerg-
ing jobs and creation of an innovation-enabling environment. 
Recommendations also begin to identify and support growth of 
key existing and emerging business sectors.
	 •			Governance  
Recommendations in the “Efficient Governance” chapter 
emphasize actions and policies to enable effective government 
execution and cooperation across the Chicago region, including 
cross-jurisdictional coordination, reform of the tax structure, 
and improving access to information.
	 •			Quality of life  
Finally, a number of GO TO 2040 recommendations whose 
primary effects are non-economic in nature will change char-
acteristics of the region in ways which may indirectly enhance 
economic performance. These effects address regional quality 
of life, and fall into two categories: lowering household costs 
and enhancing regional amenities. In combination, the quality 
of life recommendations will make the region more affordable, 
environmentally sustainable and rich in the types of amenities 
that attract and retain residents and businesses. These are 
spread throughout the four chapters of the plan.
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Economic Impacts of GO TO 2040
 
From an economic perspective, the regional scope of GO TO 2040 
provides one of its key strengths. Metropolitan areas are a critical 
unit of geography in today’s economy: they concentrate the nation’s 
assets and, through the beneficial synergies associated with that 
concentration, disproportionately produce the nation’s economic 
outputs. These synergies flow from interactions that largely oc-
cur through market and other systems that primarily operate at a 
regional scale of geography. Whether the goal is development of the 
neighborhood, the city or the suburb; human capital or business 
growth; one has to understand how the assets and markets inter-
sect and relate across — and combine to constitute — the regional 
economy. Increasingly, it is metropolitan areas, rather than nations 
or individual cities, that are competing with each other in the global 
economy.
The changes in the regional economic landscape envisioned by  
GO TO 2040 will impact five core drivers of regional economic  
performance, as described very briefly below and at length in the 
full report.
 
GO TO 2040 will increase levels of innovation and entrepreneurship  
The development of new products, services and systems that 
increase the productivity of businesses or spur the emergence of 
new markets has always been the primary source of productivity 
gains and long-term economic growth. Particularly in the knowledge 
economy, finding ways to more directly and deliberately foster in-
novation has become higher-priority for regional economic growth 
policy and practice.
Implementing the plan’s recommendations will increase levels of 
human capital, intensify knowledge networks and spillovers, and 
enhance the institutional, cultural and funding environment, boost-
ing innovation and entrepreneurship. In combination, these effects 
will increase firm productivity, formation and growth, as well as 
market development, the essence of regional economic growth.  
 
 
GO TO 2040 will enhance the performance  
of existing and emerging clusters 
Economic “clusters” are interdependent groups of firms and related 
institutions that gain benefits from their proximity and interac-
tions.  Clusters contribute to their firms’ efficiency and productivity, 
and attract new firms, by reducing transportation and transaction 
costs, enabling shared labor pools and other inputs, and facilitating 
knowledge exchange, among other benefits.
The plan’s recommendations concerning transportation infra-
structure, labor force and firms, and governance will increase 
performance of all firms in the region through expanding access 
to suppliers, partners and customers; enhancing human capital; 
better aligning worker’ abilities with employers’ needs; support-
ing innovation; and improving the impacts of regional governance.  
Many of these interventions will particularly increase the productiv-
ity of firms in key existing and emerging clusters, and the plan also 
begins to focus on tailoring these types of interventions for specific 
clusters, particularly energy efficiency goods and services. Improved 
cluster performance directly translates to increased regional eco-
nomic growth.
 
GO TO 2040 will improve the region’s spatial efficiency 
The geographic distribution of the region’s economic assets — busi-
nesses and their suppliers, workers and consumers — and the infra-
structure connecting them influence the efficiency and productivity 
of economic activity. Geographic proximity, density and accessibility 
determine transportation and transaction costs, and also influence 
the degree to which agglomeration economies are realized, such as 
the benefits of shared labor pools and knowledge spillovers.
The plan’s excellent and particularly detailed recommendations  
on transportation and the built environment will enable a more 
efficient and productive flow of goods, people and ideas, reducing 
transportation costs for businesses and households; increasing 
labor market efficiency; facilitating knowledge exchange; and pro-
moting the types of inclusive communities — mixed-use, mixed-
income and transit-accessible — that enable deployment of all of 
the region’s economic assets. The improved spatial efficiency of 
the region will grow the regional economy through both increasing 
inputs and reducing transaction costs, improving overall productiv-
ity and efficiency.
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GO TO 2040 will develop and deploy human capital 
Human capital — the knowledge, skills and expertise embedded in 
the labor force — is now the single most important input to eco-
nomic growth. However, its impact on the economy depends upon 
its deployment, which entails having rich job pools through which it 
is attracted, retained and put to work, and efficient labor markets.  
Firms and workers attract each other in an iterative process, as thriv-
ing job markets attract skilled workers, and concentrations of skilled 
workers in turn attract additional firms.
The plan’s recommendations will produce higher levels of human 
capital, better deployed in the economy, by providing higher-quality 
basic (P-12) education; increasing the levels and matching of human 
capital with job pools through community college and other training 
that is better aligned with employer needs; retaining and attracting 
human capital by supporting firm (and job) growth; and improving 
efficiency of labor markets by better aligning training, the workforce 
and jobs and by decreasing employers’ costs of evaluating potential 
workers. Higher-skilled workers efficiently deployed in appropriately 
matched jobs will increase the productivity of existing firms and at-
tract new firms, and so increase regional economic growth.
 
GO TO 2040 will improve governance to support  
private-sector economic activity 
Government enables and influences private-sector performance by 
shaping fundamental aspects of the economic environment through 
the provision of infrastructure and other public goods; the nature 
of local tax and regulatory policy; and access to quality information 
for firm and household decision-making. One of the most complex 
challenges in driving regional economic growth is determining how 
government can support private-sector activity without displacing or 
distorting it.
Implementing the plan’s recommendations concerning governance 
will leverage economies of scale in service provision, reduce inef-
ficient inter-jurisdictional competition and provide more business 
value-added for taxes and more stable long-term funding for the 
public goods most valued by businesses and households — support-
ing a “high-road” economy. They will also improve the responsive-
ness of government programs and policies and reduce businesses’ 
costs to identify and evaluate new market opportunities. In combi-
nation, these impacts will contribute to economic growth by enhanc-
ing productivity and aiding in attraction and retention of businesses 
and households.
GO TO 2040’s impacts on these five drivers of economic growth  
are mutually reinforcing. In aggregate, they will lead to higher levels 
of human capital deployed in dynamic clusters; an enhanced in-
novation and entrepreneurial environment that drives more robust 
firm growth; more streamlined movement of goods and people; and 
coordinated governance that supports and enhances the perfor-
mance of the economy.
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Next Steps in Plan Implementation
 
The GO TO 2040 plan itself is perhaps best understood as a crucial 
landmark in an enormously ambitious and important ongoing 
undertaking to understand and influence performance of the myriad 
complex factors and interactions that drive the regional economy (as 
well as many other aspects of the region). The plan provides a vital 
roadmap and takes the critical first steps, but could not possibly 
describe all of the territory, let alone traverse it. There are many  
opportunities to expand upon the plan’s recommendations and 
move forward. These opportunities are identified throughout the 
report, and could be addressed during plan implementation. They 
broadly fall into three categories.
	 •			Plan	implementation	should	more	extensively	and	directly	
focus on and engage the private-sector business community  
to complement the current focus on government and house-
holds. This focus would lead to identification of more tailored 
strategies to strengthen particular business, occupational and 
functional clusters which drive economic growth; to improve 
workforce development and labor markets to match employers’ 
anticipated human capital needs; and to design specific gov-
ernment activities enabling efficient and productive markets.
	 •			Plan	implementation	should	also	include	deeper	analysis	 
(better enabled by further engaging the private sector) of 
several aspects of the regional economy, in order to formulate 
more concrete, practical strategies for growth. A more nuanced 
understanding of the members of and dynamics within the 
region’s industry, occupational and functional concentrations 
would provide a stronger foundation for developing cluster-
specific growth strategies. Similarly, deeper analysis of the 
types and stages of innovation that present the most opportu-
nities in the context of the current regional economy, including 
particularly of early-stage innovation and commercialization of 
technology, should inform more tailored next steps. Gener-
ally, GO TO 2040 provides solid analysis to begin identifying 
the right priority issues, but more rigorous analytic work and 
strategy development  are needed to make these initial find-
ings actionable.
	 •			Finally,	the	scope	of	collaborative	efforts	recommended	in	 
GO TO 2040 should be expanded as plan implementation oc-
curs, both in terms of the substantive issues addressed and 
the range of actors involved. Inter-governmental collaboration 
should include activities beyond planning and investment — 
particularly policy coordination on issues such as housing, 
taxes and land use and zoning — to help mitigate existing 
incentives for inter-jurisdictional competition. More tailored 
cluster-specific, human capital and innovation strategies and 
implementation require broader, cross-sector collaboration 
between firms, universities, investors, government and non-
profit entities such as workforce development organizations, 
social service agencies and so on. This issue goes well beyond 
collaboration: it is the cornerstone for building a new institu-




In the knowledge economy, regions are diverging with respect 
to economic performance as success builds upon itself. At this 
crossroads, it is more important than ever to act strategically and 
deliberately to foster regional economic growth. Successful regions 
have an institutional infrastructure that creates the ongoing capac-
ity to take an integrated approach to economic growth, and to be 
flexible and adaptive in the face of changing market and economic 
circumstances. This entails open formal and informal networks and 
fluid coordination between the private, public and civic sectors.
The Chicago regional economy has enormous strengths, but we 
need this capacity to pay attention and to act in order to guarantee 
continued global leadership. The process of creating and beginning 
implementation of GO TO 2040 itself helps build this focus and key 
institutional capacity, and may be one of the plan’s most important 
contributions. While much more work needs to be done, GO TO 2040 
places the region firmly on the right path, and shows great prom-
ise, with respect to both the substance and process of generating 
continued regional prosperity.  
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GO TO 2040,1 the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning’s 
comprehensive plan for the Chicago metropolitan area, makes 
recommendations aimed at improving the standard of living in the 
Chicago region over the next 30 years. The recommendations were 
developed through a highly participatory process and reflect the 
values and future vision of the residents of the seven-county region.  
Addressing the priorities of a large and diverse region means that 
the recommendations must address multiple challenges, ranging 
from resource conservation and protection of open space, to land 
use patterns and infrastructure, to effective governance. In aggre-
gate, the recommendations are designed to maximize long-term 
economic benefits and foster livable communities throughout the 
region by prioritizing policy changes, investments and changes in 
physical infrastructure.
CMAP’s organizational history further informs the nature of  
the recommendations included in GO TO 2040. The agency  
was created in 2005 as the region’s Metropolitan Planning Or-
ganization (MPO). Established as a merger of the Chicago Area 
Transportation Study (CATS) and the Northeastern Illinois Planning 
Commission (NIPC), CMAP is charged with regional land use and 
transportation planning, as well as forecasts of regional growth, 
housing, environmental integrity and natural resource protection, 
and multi-faceted evaluation of alternative future scenarios for the 
region.2 GO TO 2040 addresses a more extensive range of regional 
issues than past plans, and its scope and “point of view” are more 
broadly concerned with the overall well being of the region, includ-
ing its economic performance. Nevertheless, CMAP is a specialized 
governmental agency, primarily making recommendations with 
respect to government policy: in particular, it is not an economic 
development agency.
The Chicago Community Trust commissioned this report to exam-
ine the impacts that the recommendations contained in the plan 
can be expected to have on the economic future of the region. This 
entails two limitations in scope: it is only about the recommenda-
tions, and it is only about the economy. In other words, first, this 
report only examines aspects of the economy for which CMAP makes 
recommendations. While, as will be seen, the plan is thoughtfully 
designed and can be anticipated to have a very substantial positive 
impact on the region’s economic performance, it is not intended 
to address all of the activities critical to strengthening the region’s 
economy, many of which are beyond CMAP’s jurisdiction (and so 
beyond the scope of this inquiry). Rather, the plan is crafted to sup-
plement, support, enable and complement those other activities, 
many of which occur largely in the private sector, where long-term 
economic growth is ultimately produced.
Second, the focus here is on examining the GO TO 2040 recommen-
dations solely from an economic perspective. The plan addresses 
a wide range of important objectives for the region, such as public 
health, environmental integrity and overall quality of life. These are 
of course critically important: indeed, from an economic perspec-
tive, they are fundamental preconditions — sufficiently clean air and 
water, a baseline level of public safety, and so on — to the existence 
of any level of economic activity in the region.3 However, the focus 
of this inquiry is on the recommendations which might directly 
increase regional economic outputs — gross metropolitan product, 
employment and wages — which occur through growth in the num-
ber, size, productivity and efficiency of firms in the region.
In addition to direct economic impacts, the paper also highlights 
three types of secondary economic impacts. First, many of the 
recommendations will contribute to the economic resilience of 
the region: even if they do not directly influence growth, they will 
strengthen the economy by making it less subject to downturns 
in the face of outside shocks. Second, the report touches on the 
cost-saving effects many of the recommendations will have for 
households, potentially facilitating more economically productive 
consumption and investment. Finally, the report also addresses 
the degree to which the plan’s recommendations may enhance the 
region’s quality-of-life amenities that aid in attracting and retain-
ing households and firms. In terms of the regional economy, these 
effects do not as necessarily translate into measures of economic 
growth, but they remain noteworthy for their potential contribution.
Finally, because GO TO 2040 recommends broad policy changes, 
rather than specific operational activities, the assessments of po-
tential impact on the region’s economy contained in this document 
are necessarily qualitative in nature. The report examines whether 
the recommendations are well tailored to strengthen and grow 
the regional economy, drawing on economic theory and empirical 
research. It examines how the GO TO 2040 recommendations will 
influence the key drivers of regional economic growth.  Where pos-
sible, illustrative estimates of the possible magnitude of economic 
impact are provided by extrapolating from empirical research, but 
given the high-level nature of the recommendations, no quantitative 
research or conclusions could be provided here.
In order to undertake this analysis, Chapter I first describes how the 
high-level recommendations and more specific implementation ac-
tions can be anticipated to influence the underlying characteristics 
of the region which affect economic performance — the “economic 
landscape.” Chapter II then briefly provides an economic frame-
work for understanding regional economies, identifying the key 
drivers of regional economic growth that are affected by the plan. 
With this backdrop, it is then possible to examine how the changes 
in the characteristics of the region will influence performance of 
the regional economy through their impact on each of these driv-
ers, specifically with respect to innovation (Chapter III), business 
clusters (Chapter IV), spatial efficiency (Chapter V), human capital 
(Chapter VI), effective governance (Chapter VII) and through indirect 
impacts (Chapter VIII).
Introduction
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CHAPTER I:  
How GO TO 2040 Will Change the Economic Landscape
The recommendations that comprise GO TO 2040 address a diverse 
range of issues that are important to the future of the region, rang-
ing from water conservation to workforce development. From the 
economic point of view, implementing these recommendations will 







The relevant recommendations and their influence on each of these 
regional characteristics are briefly described below. The more de-
tailed implementation areas embedded in the recommendations are 
further discussed as appropriate in subsequent chapters.
Characteristic 1:  
Transportation Infrastructure
 
Together, this group of recommendations prioritizes investments 
in the region’s roads, freight rail and transit systems. They call for 
transportation system improvements to streamline the movement of 
goods and people within and through the region. Three recommen-




Overall, GO TO 2040 primarily recommends re-investing in  
and improving existing infrastructure, as well as creating new 
infrastructure that is well-connected, well-maintained and utilizes 
up-to-date flow management technologies. In prioritizing neces-
sary investments to meet these objectives, two key principles are 
reflected in this combination of recommendations. In simplified 
terms, these are:
	 •			“Fix	it	first”	—	Prioritize	improvement	of	existing	infrastructure	
components over building new ones (whether in densely devel-
oped areas or elsewhere); and
	 •			“Do	no	harm”	—	Avoid	new	infrastructure	investments	that	
encourage a sprawling development pattern.
Specific transportation infrastructure investment recommenda-
tions include maintenance and upgrading of public transit; targeted 
transit service expansion; modernization of rail infrastructure to 
streamline freight movements; and maintenance and modernization 
of road infrastructure, to serve both freight and passenger traffic.
Further, new financing mechanisms and incentives — and adjust-
ments to existing ones — are recommended to fund needed invest-
ments, while also encouraging increased use of public transit and 




Successful implementation of these transportation recommenda-
tions will allow businesses and residents to carry out their daily 
activities more quickly, easily and safely. The region will experi-
ence: reduced traffic congestion per capita,5 lower travel times for 
commuting and other trips, reduced vehicle miles traveled, lower 
vehicle-based carbon emissions and improved system safety. The 
recommendations will reduce the need for travel via private auto, 
lower costs of transportation, increase residents’ ability to access 
education and employment opportunities and improve businesses’ 
ability to move goods smoothly into, out of and through the region.
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Characteristic 2: Built Environment
 
One recommendation addresses accommodating future population 
growth through a pattern of more compact land use and strategic 
investment in supportive infrastructure such as water, sewer and 
stormwater management systems:
	 •			Achieve	greater	livability	through	land	use	and	housing6 
The over-arching principle for addressing the region’s built environ-
ment is that of “livability:” “a focus on reinvestment; denser, mixed-
use development; walkability and support for transit; a range of 
housing options; environmental protection; design and aesthetics; 
and the context or ‘fit’ of development with the local community.”  
The implementation actions therefore focus on investment and 
development efforts in existing communities, in order to capitalize 
on their existing infrastructure, building stock and social capital.  
They encourage new development and redevelopment that reflects 
a more compact pattern and facilitates use of public transit, as well 
as land-use regulations that allow for a mix of uses within close 
proximity to one another.
Implementation of this recommendation will: increase density in 
residential and commercial nodes; slow the consumption of open 
space by development; preserve open space and productive agri-
cultural lands; decrease the need for travel via private auto to reach 
employment, education and key amenities; and increase the ease 
of face-to-face interaction among residents, businesses and other 
local institutions.
Characteristic 3: Labor Force and Firms
 
A third group of recommendations focuses primarily on supporting 
the growth of businesses in the region through continued devel-
opment of a skilled workforce, creation of an innovation-enabling 
environment and a focus on developing jobs in emerging sectors. 
While many of the recommendations included in GO TO 2040 will 
affect the performance of the region’s businesses, two in particular 
form the foundation for addressing this objective:
	 •			Improve	education	and	workforce	development
	 •			Support	economic	innovation
The first of these recommendations addresses improvements to 
both the P-12 and post-secondary education and training systems, 
as well as coordination across the entire P-20 system, to create a 
more skilled workforce. Basic education implementation actions 
address improving the quality of and equitable access to early 
childhood, primary and secondary education and shrinking the 
racial achievement gap in basic education. To address post-high 
school education and training needs, the implementation actions 
include refocusing workforce development activities to meet the 
future needs of employers (beginning with high-priority clusters 
such as freight/logistics and green energy/technology industries); 
increasing coordination among workforce development providers 
and strengthening the role of workforce intermediaries (includ-
ing particularly community colleges); establishing a data-sharing 
platform to track progress, assess program effectiveness and plan 
for future needs; developing and articulating clear educational and 
career pathways; improving the accessibility and quality of educa-
tion and training programs; supporting individuals at critical transi-
tion points within the workforce development system; and making 
program delivery mechanisms both stronger and more flexible.
Implementation of these education and workforce development 
recommendations will lead to a higher-skilled workforce that is 
better-qualified for and matched to the changing regional job 
market; increasing labor force participation; stronger labor pools 
for employers; and higher productivity (and correspondingly higher 
wages) for employees.
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The second recommendation aims to influence levels of innovation 
across the entire economy, in four primary categories7:
	 •		 Information 
Measure, track and analyze input and outcome metrics, as well 
as innovation program results, to gain a better understanding 
of the regional environment for innovation, including where 
public-sector investment may be warranted;
	 •			Commercialization 
Encourage public-private collaboration, technology transfer 
and commercialization of innovative ideas; provide training 
for innovators to become more effective entrepreneurs; and 
refocus the “success” measure of regional technology transfer 
programs on generating commercially viable products and 
services (versus focusing on patents, whether they are com-
mercialized or not);  
	 •			Funding 
Identify new opportunities for funding and increase access to 
funding across all stages of innovation, with particular em-
phasis on creation of a new, regionally focused venture capital 
fund; and
	 •			Innovation culture 
Generate more pervasive publicity around entrepreneurial 
“success stories;” facilitate greater collaboration between 
innovation programs, conferences and competitions; involve 
philanthropic organizations in creating linkages among diverse 
innovation stakeholders and showcasing the region’s inno-
vations; and identify opportunities for regulatory reform to 
encourage the commercialization of technology.
A final aspect of the innovation recommendation advocates focusing 
on the region’s key industry clusters or areas of specialization. As 
a first step, analysis of the inner workings of the region’s clusters 
and their workforces will likely focus on the high-potential areas 
of freight/logistics, green energy/technology and biomed/bio-
tech, with work on other clusters to follow in subsequent phases.  
Implementation actions for the first phase of cluster-based innova-
tion work include encouraging emergence of “innovation leaders” 
in regional clusters; facilitating the adoption of “green” business 
standards and processes across all clusters; and establishing a 
metropolitan-or Great Lakes-focused venture capital fund, with a 
potential emphasis on green technology.
Implementation of the innovation recommendation will lead to a 
larger number of collaborative research and development projects 
linking the public, private and institutional sectors; higher technol-
ogy patenting rates; and higher rates of technology commercializa-
tion and entrepreneurship, particularly in key industry clusters.
 
 
While their inclusion in GO TO 2040 is not primarily to spur firm  
and job growth, two narrower recommendations8 also fit in this 




These recommendations advocate specific actions that will support 
two clusters — one existing and one emerging — influencing the 
region’s industry and occupational mix.9 The road and rail transpor-
tation improvements described earlier (Characteristic 1, Transpor-
tation Infrastructure), when combined with the intended cluster-
specific innovation strategy mentioned above, will reduce costs 
and increase development of new products, processes and services 
for firms in the regional freight and logistics cluster. The second 
policy’s recommendations include implementation of the Chicago 
Region Retrofit Ramp-up (CR3) Program to catalyze energy efficiency 
building retrofits; development of new green building design guide-
lines; and adoption of a revised energy code for new building design 
and construction. These recommendations will increase demand for 
energy-efficient buildings, driving market emergence, and will lower 
market transaction costs.
Over time, implementation of these cluster-focused recommenda-
tions — and ultimately, those for other clusters within the region — 
will broadly attract new firms to the region; increase the rate of new 
firm creation; fill gaps in existing supply chains; and enhance the 
performance of firms within clusters.
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Characteristic 4: Governance
 
A fourth group of recommendations draws attention to the benefits 
that more effective government execution and cooperation can have 





The first of these recommendations advocates that federal and state 
programs more effectively work together across traditional agency 
“silos” (instead of being limited by them), and that corresponding 
funding be allocated at the regional (rather than state or municipal) 
scale where appropriate; that federal and state agencies modify 
program criteria, priorities and compliance requirements to stream-
line regional implementation; that CMAP take on a leadership role 
on policy and planning issues that cross jurisdictional boundaries; 
and that local government services be coordinated or consolidated 
where it makes sense to do so. The tax policy recommends that a 
Regional Tax Policy Task Force be formed to examine the impact of 
existing property, income and sales tax systems on regional land 
use patterns, as well as business attraction, retention and perfor-
mance; streamline and improve the transparency of the tax system 
where possible; and broaden the tax base in an effort to keep rates 
low. The information policy recommends increasing the amount of 
high-quality data collected on regional performance through CMAP’s 
Regional Indicators Project; positioning CMAP as a central informa-
tion repository and facilitator of inter-governmental information 
flows; increasing free electronic access to and usability of govern-
ment data sets by residents, businesses and other organizations (in-
cluding making the Regional Indicators available through a regional 
web portal); facilitating a more streamlined flow of information 
from governments to the public; and providing technical assistance 
and acting as a resource to regional governments in their local data 
transparency and accessibility efforts.
Successful implementation of these recommendations will: increase 
funding for necessary public goods on an ongoing basis; mitigate 
tax system features that may unintentionally distort local land use 
decisions; reduce duplication in public services; increase electronic 
access to user-friendly public information by governmental units, 
business and private citizens; and increase the level of coordination 
among local units of government.
Characteristic 5: Quality of Life
 
A number of GO TO 2040 recommendations whose primary effects 
are not economic will change characteristics of the region in ways 
which may indirectly strengthen the economy. These effects address 
the regional quality of life, and fall into two categories: lowering 
household costs and enhancing regional amenities. The effects of 
both types of recommendations will make the region more afford-
able, environmentally sustainable and rich in the types of amenities 
that help attract and retain residents and businesses.
Household Cost Savings 
Households will benefit from lower costs, primarily as a result of 
the GO TO 2040 recommendations related to improving transporta-
tion infrastructure and supporting energy and water conservation 
efforts, including residential retrofits. Lower roadway congestion 
and improved public transit will lower household transportation 
costs, while the lower energy and water consumption resulting from 
residential retrofitting and other conservation-based measures will 
lower household utility costs.
Amenities 
A number of recommendations address qualities of the region that 
make it a desirable place in which to live, work and do business.  
These include those related to transit investment and transit-sup-
portive land use; design of livable, walkable mixed-use communi-
ties; conservation of water and energy resources (through building 
retrofitting, water resource management, green infrastructure and 
other strategies); promotion of sustainable local food (both produc-
tion and distribution); and expansion and improvement of parks 
and open space, prioritizing efforts in areas that contain sensitive 
natural resources, lack adequate open space access or where con-
nections can be strengthened between existing parks or preserves.  
All of these recommendations — and, broadly, the plan’s focus on 
creating livable, less costly, communities — will have a positive 
impact on the lifestyle and amenity options available in the region, 
helping attract workers and firms.
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How will the GO TO 2040-driven changes in the characteristics of 
the region, described in Chapter I, affect its economic performance?  
This chapter begins by laying out the rationale for focusing on re-
gions as the critical unit of geography in today’s economy. A simple 
framework is then provided to describe the way a regional economy 
operates, in terms of its basic components and mechanisms, in 
the context of global trends in the economy. This framework allows 
identification of five leverage points that are currently key drivers of 
regional economic growth, and that are affected by the changes in 
the economic landscape anticipated to flow from GO TO 2040. With 
this context, subsequent chapters then examine in detail, for each 
leverage point, how it operates to increase economic growth and 
how the GO TO 2040-driven changes will affect the leverage point to 
enhance economic performance.
 
A. The Importance of Regional Economies
 
Population has become increasingly concentrated in the past 50 
years, both within the U.S. and globally. As of 2009, the propor-
tion of the world population living in urban areas had passed the 
50% mark, and is expected to reach 69%, or 6.3 billion people, by 
2050.10 Population concentration has made the U.S., in particular, 
a “metro nation,” with 84% of the population living in metropolitan 
areas.11 Infrastructure and institutions are also highly concentrated, 
with the largest 100 U.S. metropolitan areas boasting 66% of the na-
tion’s research universities, 92% of air passenger traffic and 95% of 
public transit passenger miles.12 This trend toward concentration in 
metropolitan areas is expected to continue, as growth in these areas 
is outpacing non-metro areas.13 
The extent to which people and other economic assets are concen-
trated in metropolitan regions is striking, but more significant is the 
disproportionate degree to which metropolitan areas contribute to 
the national economy. While the 100 largest U.S. metropolitan areas 
are home to about two thirds of the nation’s population,14  they 
generate 73% of the nation’s economic output (gross product).15 
Further, they produce a disproportionate share of jobs, knowledge 
workers, patents, research and venture capital investments.16 Met-
ropolitan areas not only aggregate the assets that matter most, but 
also amplify them through geographic agglomeration and multi-
plier effects that connect and boost inputs and outputs to generate 
regional — and thus national — prosperity.17 In short, metropolitan 
areas are where the nation’s assets agglomerate to create most of 
the nation’s economic value.
This is no coincidence. As research in the burgeoning field of 
economic geography is demonstrating almost daily, the geographic 
proximity of key assets and actors in the economy enhances their 
individual and collective performance.18 Indeed, this appears to be 
truer than ever in the knowledge economy. From an economist’s 
point of view, the reason for the very existence of cities — and their 
attendant economic regions — is to reduce the transportation costs 
of goods, people and ideas.19 Dense networks of suppliers, service 
providers and customers within close proximity of firms reduce 
transportation and transaction costs. The benefits of concentration 
provide additional “agglomeration economies” through shared 
inputs to production, deep labor pools and knowledge spillovers.20   
Large, diverse labor pools enable firms to more efficiently find 
and hire the particular types of workers that they need to be most 
productive. The opportunity for face-to-face interaction across firms 
and between individuals, as well as the movement of employees be-
tween firms, facilitates the sharing of ideas that generates increas-
ing returns to knowledge and spurs innovative activity.21 
As a result, increasingly, it is regions22 — and not nations — that are 
primarily competing in the global economy.23 It thus makes sense for 
GO TO 2040 to be focused on the region as the key geographic unit 
for facilitating economic growth. A slightly more detailed examina-
tion of how the components and mechanisms of a regional economy 
interact to achieve these benefits will enable exploration of how the 
specific recommendations of the plan will influence these interac-
tions, and ultimately regional economic performance.
CHAPTER II: Regional Economies
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B. What Drives Regional Economic Growth
 
Regional economies are complex, dynamic systems arising from the 
interactions of housing, labor, business and other market systems 
with characteristics of place, all enabled and shaped by government 
and civic sector activity, as well as by an equally complex global 
environment and marketplace. System performance is a function of 
the interactions of millions of people and firms in this market and 
institutional context, with the actions of each affecting the behavior 
of the others in an ongoing, iterative cycle. To improve the deploy-
ment of assets — to create jobs, income and wealth — requires 
understanding how these systems work, in order to understand how 
to influence their performance. For particular interventions, this may 
entail working at sub-regional geographies specific to the system of 
interest, but in any event it entails thinking and acting within a re-
gional framework. Whether the goal is development of the neighbor-
hood, the city or the suburb; human capital or business growth; one 
has to understand how the assets and markets intersect and relate 
across — and combine to constitute — the regional economy.
Analyzing how any given change will impact its performance entails 
first understanding the context and key components of the econo-
my, and the systems through which they interact to deploy assets 
efficiently and productively (or not).
 
 
The outputs of the regional economy — the total value of goods and 
services produced (gross regional product) — result from the com-
plex interactions of millions of individuals and businesses. These 
interactions take place through a set of overlapping and interrelated 
systems — primarily market systems — that combine and trans-
form inputs (factors of production) into tangible economic results.  
The quality of these interactions — specifically the efficiency and 
productivity of these systems — depends in part on the enabling 
environment (such as infrastructure), which in turn is determined by 
local governmental and civic institutions, as well as natural qualities 
of place. From a micro-economic point of view, increasing outputs 
inherently flows from business sector growth — increasing the 
number, size and productivity of firms in the region. Business sector 
growth, in turn, occurs through firm creation and growth, retention 
and attraction. Firms grow and choose to locate where they can be 
most efficient and productive (a function of both firm and system, 
particularly market system, operations). We are thus ultimately con-
cerned with what attributes of the region — its factors of production, 
transformative systems and local enabling environment — lead to 
increasing creation, efficiency and productivity of firms.
Factors of Production
(Human capital; 




(Market processes – 
housing, labor, business; 
production dynamics – 
clusters, value chains, etc.; 




Local (Regional) Enabling Environment
(Government regulation, taxation and public 
goods, including particularly infrastructure 
and education; civic institutions; quality of 
place, including the natural environment)
Economic Outputs
(Businesses – 





(Increasing role of knowledge factors;
demand for exports to emerging markets;
low-carbon/greening across the economy, etc.)
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Examining these dynamic interactions and operations of the com-
ponents of a regional economy enables identification of the main 
drivers of regional economic growth which can be influenced by in-
terventions. As discussed extensively in the chapters which follow:
	 •		The	balance	of	taxation	and	public	goods;	the	quality	of	particu-
lar public goods, especially infrastructure and education; and 
the public, private and civic culture are all critical factors in the 
enabling environment for economic activity;
	 •		Knowledge	embedded	in	the	labor	force	(human	capital)	and	
in information resources and technologies is an increasingly 
important factor of production; and
	 •		The	dynamics	of	“clusters”	of	firms	and	related	institutions;	
the innovation “ecosystem”; and, as always, the efficiency of 
market operations are the critical processes (transformative 
systems) determining the efficiency and productivity of eco-
nomic production.
 
Focusing on these key aspects of how a regional economy functions 
enables identification of five key leverage points through which 
CMAP’s GO TO 2040 recommendations will impact the metropolitan 
Chicago economy:24 
	 •		Fostering an innovation- and entrepreneurship- 
enabling environment 
The ability to innovate has been a longstanding driver of pro-
ductivity gains, and is a growing priority in policy and practice 
targeting economic growth.25 
	 •		Enhancing performance of existing and emerging clusters 
Concentrated economic activity benefits the production of 
goods and services by reducing transportation costs, enabling 
shared labor and other inputs, facilitating spillovers and ex-
change and enhancing innovation.26 
	 •		Improving the region’s spatial efficiency 
The location of businesses, suppliers, workers and consumers 
within a region — and the infrastructure connecting them — 
determines the transportation costs between them, and also 
influences the economic benefits of agglomeration, such as 
shared labor pools and knowledge spillovers.27 
	 •		Developing and deploying human capital 
Human capital is the single most important input to economic 
growth, but leveraging it to improve regional economic perfor-
mance requires not just producing high levels of education and 
skills, but also retaining and deploying talent through creation 
of and alignment with employment opportunities.28 
 
 
	 •		Improving governance to support private-sector  
economic activity 
Government can enable and enhance private-sector perfor-
mance by shaping the fundamental dimensions of economic 
interactions and production, including establishing market 
conditions, developing human capital and infrastructure and  
so forth.29 
 
Finally, the regional economy operates in the context of a changing 
global and macroeconomic environment, which similarly informs 
these leverage points. This context also influences how the lever-
age points operate to affect productivity and growth, and whether 
they are directed toward viable long-term growth trajectories. The 
rise of the knowledge economy,30 in particular, infuses much of the 
discussion that follows. The increasing role of knowledge embedded 
in people and technologies in driving economic growth has had — 
and can be expected to continue to have — enormous implications 
for the relative importance of inputs (e.g., high human capital); 
drivers and how they operate (e.g., knowledge spillovers, functional 
concentrations, institutional and innovation economics); and even 
the spatial arrangement of assets (e.g., benefits of density facilitat-
ing face-to-face interaction and idea exchange).31 
The chapters that comprise the balance of this document articulate, 
for each leverage point, (a) what it means and why it is significant 
for economic growth; and (b) how the GO TO 2040 recommenda-
tions will influence it, and so translate into impact on performance 
of the regional economy.
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A. Definition and Significance
 
Innovation is the development of new ideas, products, services, 
technologies, processes, systems, organizational structures and 
business models that increase the efficiency or productivity of 
business operations or spur the emergence of new markets.32 This 
definition, while useful in its breadth, potentially encompasses 
nearly every potential change to economic production. For practical 
purposes, it proves important to tease out some of the dimensions 
of and distinctions within innovation, particularly related to stages 
and levels:
	 •		Stages 
As used here, innovation is defined as spanning the entire 
spectrum from basic research and idea generation, through 
concept testing, product development, commercialization (in-
troduction into the marketplace) and business creation, growth 
and expansion. Despite the conceptual clarity of such a linear 
model from idea generation to business and market growth, 
recent work in the field views the innovation process as more 
iterative and open: “particular innovative activities can both be 
cause and result, consequence and prerequisite.”33 That is, an 
innovation process need not include all of the stages articulat-
ed in the chain or complete them in a strictly sequential order.34 
   Defining and examining innovation this broadly — to go well be-
yond invention to firm and market creation and growth — makes 
particular sense from an economic development point of view: 
the definition used here explicitly includes the stages which 
translate the inventive process to a measurable impact on the 
economy. In order to impact the regional economy, a new idea 
must ultimately be deployed — it must “push existing compa-
nies to real cost reductions and new firms toward growth.”35 For 
this reason, entrepreneurship is included here in the spectrum 
of innovation activities, as it is often a key step in translating 
new products into economic activity.36 
	 •		Levels 
Like many other subjects in economic development, innovation 
can be approached at both the firm (micro) level and the market 
or system (macro) level. A vast business literature targeted 
at firms highlights very specific firm innovation practices and 
disciplines, as well as broader issues such as firm “culture.”37   
While innovation overwhelmingly occurs within individual firms, 
in the aggregate firms constitute and are part of larger market 
systems and institutional (including government) environments 
which determine firm inputs (e.g., human capital), market de-
mand and adoption, and an overall “innovation ecosystem,”38 
all of which in turn influence firm innovation. Given our focus on 
regional economic development practice, we will be primarily 
focused on system level interventions here.
 
From an economic standpoint, innovation is the source of all long-
term economic growth, since it is the only path to increasing the 
quantity and quality of the goods produced from the finite resources 
of the overall economy.39 Innovation has received much more atten-
tion, particularly as a direct focus for economic growth interven-
tions, with the emergence of the knowledge economy, including 
through “new growth theory” and “innovation economics.”40 
Generally, in the knowledge economy, knowledge embedded in 
labor force (human capital) and technology is increasingly important 
to economic success (including particularly to innovation), and con-
centrations of knowledge factors (high human capital, information 
sectors and technologies, innovation infrastructure, etc.) build upon 
themselves — with increasing rather than diminishing returns —  
so that, in effect, the places that get ahead tend to keep getting 
further ahead.41 
This dynamic, in combination with an increasingly open global 
marketplace, has led researchers and practitioners to place a higher 
priority on finding ways to more directly and deliberately foster in-
novation, and thereby catalyze economic growth. The growing inten-
sity of global competition makes it more imperative for nations and 
regions to gain and maintain a competitive edge in creating the next 
generation of products, services, processes and business models.42 
The pressure of international competition is evidenced in other na-
tions’ challenges to long-standing U.S. leadership on key indicators 
like worldwide shares of domestic R&D spending, new patents and 
science and engineering degree holders and publications.43 Indeed, 
arguably, in the “next economy,”44  the speed of economic change 
has accelerated — with shortened product development cycles; 
increased business “churn” (Schumpeter’s “creative destruction”45); 
nearly instantaneous global exchange of information; lower costs 
and faster transportation of goods; the advent of internet based 
“open” innovation-development processes; and the emergence of 
large-scale markets in developing nations.46 In this context, finding 
ways to effectively foster an “innovation ecosystem”47 — all of the 
components that collectively lead to more development of cutting-
edge ideas and commercialization of new technologies, enhancing 
both productive and adaptive efficiency48 — has become a higher 
priority for driving economic growth.
CHAPTER III: Fostering an Innovation- and  
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As a result of this focus, more sophisticated understandings are 
emerging of the stages, mechanisms and drivers of innovation as it 
translates to economic growth — from idea to product to commer-
cialization, business formation (or deployment in existing business) 
and market growth — and of the factors influencing actors’ ability 
to progress successfully through the stages and achieve economic 
impact.49 Broadly, in formulating a strategic approach to designing 
innovation-enhancing initiatives targeted to the circumstances of 
their local economy, practitioners need to address three broad (and 
overlapping) areas:
	 •		Foundational — Inputs and Ecosystem 
These are the basic inputs and infrastructure that set the stage 
for building regional innovation capacity and are virtually iden-
tical to the leverage points discussed in depth in other chapters 
of this paper.50 
	 •	 Stage-Specific 
Interventions can be tailored and targeted to those stages of 
the innovation process where barriers or opportunities are 
particularly present.51 
	 •		Industry- and Cluster Specific 
Many of what could otherwise be considered “foundational”  
or stage-specific interventions are often better organized 
around, tailored to and delivered in the context of particular 
cluster strategies.
Policy makers and practitioners can identify which specific factors 
and interventions exhibit the greatest potential for accelerating in-
novation with respect to each of these areas.52   
To that end, the emerging body of research and practice can be 
organized into five key strategies that enhance regional innovation 
and entrepreneurship activities (and which are addressed to varying 
degrees in CMAP’s GO TO 2040 recommendations):
	 •	Develop	high-quality	human	capital	
	 •		Facilitate	networks	that	enable	interaction	and	spillover	of	
ideas among knowledge workers (including strengthening of 





The general and critical importance of human capital to economic 
growth is discussed in Chapter VI. One of the key ways in which the 
level of human capital embodied in a region’s labor force influences 
economic growth is through its impact on innovation. In general, 
higher levels of education53 — particularly in science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields54 tend to be associated 
with higher levels of innovation. While data limitations often dictate 
that researchers use formal educational attainment as a proxy for 
human capital, it is higher levels of human capital more broadly 
that lead to innovation, and human capital encompasses all of the 
skills embedded in the labor force, including particularly the many 
and often more important skills learned through experience and on 
the job. Practical, experiential and technical skills are particularly 
important to certain types of innovation, such as developing a user-
friendly new product feature or instituting a time-saving adjustment 
to a manufacturing process. In addition, the human capital profile 
of successful entrepreneurs is often quite distinct from the human 
capital required in the earlier idea generation and product develop-
ment stages of the innovation process. Successful entrepreneurs, 
for example, tend to be less risk-averse and more resilient.55 Finally, 
as discussed immediately below, the knowledge spillovers and 
synergies enabled by concentrations of these varied kinds of human 
capital are also key contributors to a region’s innovative capacity.
Knowledge Networks and Spillovers 
The exchange of ideas, and particularly their combination in varied 
and novel ways, is a key factor for driving all stages of the innova-
tion process, enhancing the innovative capacity of human capital 
beyond what would be achievable in isolation.56 These “knowledge 
spillovers” can occur as the result of informal social ties, worker 
mobility among firms and institutions (as their knowledge is com-
bined and recombined with that of others)57 or through more formal 
networks and events that bring researchers, entrepreneurs and 
other relevant actors together. Depending on the industry, patenting 
and innovation may be increased by spillovers either between actors 
in the same industry, or across industry boundaries.58 One way to 
increase spillovers of either type is to provide formal networking 
opportunities such as industry-or occupation-specific professional 
organizations or forums in which diverse groups of individuals and 
firms can interact and cross-fertilize around problems or topics of 
mutual interest.59 
Institutional Environment and Culture 
The institutional environment, including — but far from limited to 
— government, can provide incentives (or disincentives) for certain 
types of activities that contribute to the region’s degree of innova-
tive and entrepreneurial activity.60 Institutional frameworks shape 
the ways in which economic actors behave and the way an economy 
evolves over time, by laying out the processes, routines, rules and 
regulations that govern the engagement of actors in various types 
of transactions. For example, university policies around royalties, 
equity investments and related aspects of technology transfer may 
negatively affect researchers’ propensity to commercialize universi-
ty-developed technologies via new firm creation.61 Conversely, the 
presence of intermediary organizations and information networks 
that facilitate access, communication and support across public- 
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private, industry and other boundaries can foster a more dynamic 
environment for innovation and entrepreneurship.62 
The formal framework of institutional policies, regulations and ad-
ministrative procedures clearly shapes the regional innovation en-
vironment. However, less tangible aspects of the region’s business 
culture also have a meaningful impact on the level of local innova-
tion and entrepreneurship, influencing the way that private firms 
and individuals interact with public, civic and other institutional ac-
tors63 through the set of norms, values, tacit conventions and “rules 
of the game” in a place.64 Regions that exhibit certain cultural values 
are more likely to facilitate growth through innovation. These values 
include an openness to new people and ideas; appreciation of risk 
taking and tolerance of failure; promotion of cooperation and coor-
dination; emphasis on learning; pursuit of public-private consensus; 
company commitments to social well being; perception of science 
as socially valuable; strong interface mechanisms in the scientific, 
technology, production and financial fields; university and work-
force training systems linked to the private sector; and flexibility 
and adaptability of organizations, labor force and consumers.65 
A region’s institutional environment and culture are not only impor-
tant in their ability to be flexible at a given point in time, but also in 
their ability to change over time — their “adaptive efficiency.”66 The 
ability of economies and institutions to continually adjust course 
and reinvent themselves over time, in response to changing cir-
cumstances, depends upon “the willingness of a society to acquire 
knowledge and learning, to induce innovation, to undertake risk 
and creative activity of all sorts, as well as to resolve problems and 
bottlenecks of the society through time.”67 A cultural and institution-
al environment that embraces and adapts to change, even change 
as drastic as contemplated by Schumpeter’s concept of “creative 
destruction,”68 plays a critical role in driving economic progress 
through innovation.
Funding 
Though the causal mechanism may be complex, a large amount of 
empirical research highlights the positive relationship between ac-
cess to stage-appropriate funding (see illustrative chart, below) and 
successful innovation. Availability of R&D funding ensures sufficient 
resources are dedicated to early stages of the innovation process 
in which solutions are formulated and technologies are developed, 
but which are higher risk, have longer time horizons to generate 
economic returns, and for which the innovator may not capture all of 
the economic value created.69 These barriers and externalities par-
ticularly justify public subsidies for early stage R&D.70 Government-
funded basic research has substantially driven many major techno-
logical innovations,71 including development of the internet. 
Securing sufficient financial support can also be a significant ob-
stacle for new businesses with high growth potential,72 posing an 
additional challenge to their survival during the critical early stages 
of development. Though only a small share of start-ups receive ven-
ture capital (VC) investments, VC in particular is often cited as a key 
ingredient to the success of innovative new businesses.73 VC invest-
ments provide a necessary bridge that sustains growing businesses 
between early-stage “friends and family” or “angel” funding and 
eligibility for traditional bank financing, providing the entrepreneurs 
the opportunity to cross what has been referred to as the “valley of 
death” for innovative ventures.74 
The stages of innovation and their respective funding sources are 
illustrated in the chart below.75 
 
Figure 2. Sequential model of development and funding
Note:
The arrows across the top of, and in between, the five stages represented in this sequential 
model are intended to suggest the many complex ways in which the stages interrelate.
Multiple exit options are available to technology enterpreneurs at different stages in this 
branching sequence of events.
The region corresponding to early-stage technology development is shaded in grey.
The boxes at top indicate milestones in the development of a science-based innovation.































Sequential model of development and funding
source frequently funds this technological stage
source occasionally funds this technological state
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Entrepreneurship and Small Firm Growth 
A dynamic entrepreneurship and small-business community en-
hances innovation through both taking inventions to market, and 
because much innovative activity originates in these firms.76 A high 
rate of new firm creation is linked with increased levels of innova-
tive activity,77 and a high rate of “business churn”78 suggests that a 
region is replacing outdated firms with innovative and efficient com-
panies. Creation of high-growth “gazelles,” in particular, is a funda-
mental (some argue primary) source of job and wealth creation79 in 
today’s environment of “entrepreneurial capitalism.”80 
 
Driving Entrepreneurship/New Firm Starts 
Many of the mechanisms that affect levels of entrepreneurship over-
lap with those already discussed in relation to innovation, includ-
ing the presence of skilled, entrepreneurial human capital (both in 
entrepreneurs themselves, as well as their employees), a regulatory 
and legal environment in which there are few obstacles to new firm 
creation and start-up,81 and the availability of stage-appropriate 
financing. It is also important that the innovation pipeline — ideas, 
applied R&D, testing, product development — be strong, so that 
entrepreneurs have a rich pool from which to select the most prom-
ising opportunities for commercialization.82 Universities play a large 
role in developing technologies with commercial potential, and the 
more streamlined and timely is the process of technology transfer — 
moving ideas “out the door” — the more active and successful the 
entrepreneurial segment of the economy can be.83 
 
Supporting Small Firm Growth 
Relationships with complementary firms facilitate and accelerate 
growth of entrepreneurial ventures. Firms that provide knowledge-
intensive business services (KIBS)84 can also act as “bridges” or in-
terfaces aiding small- and medium-sized firms’ innovation activities. 
The explicit and tacit knowledge that small firms receive from KIBS 
providers, when combined with the firms’ own industry-and firm-
specific knowledge, enable an increased pace of firm growth and 
development.85 Additionally, establishing strategic alliances with 
firms that exhibit complementary knowledge bases can increase 
small firms’ level of innovative activity and enable them to grow 
more rapidly than they would if working in isolation.86 
Myriad programs have been designed to provide technical and sup-
portive services to small firms, with mixed success. It appears that 
entrepreneurs tend to benefit more from peer exchange and from 
mentors with deep business experience; and that technical assis-
tance services are more effective when highly tailored to the type 
of business and stage of development, and packaged with practical 
hands-on engagement, finance or other types of tangible support.87   
Networks of private-sector partners (particularly peer networks 
between early-stage firms), technical assistance programs, profes-
sional service providers and investors can be important mechanisms 
for strengthening small and emerging firms.
B. Impacts of GO TO 2040 Recommendations 
 
It is now possible to begin directly addressing the question of how 
implementation of the recommendations in GO TO 2040 will impact 
the regional economy. Currently, the region’s performance on inno-
vation and entrepreneurship does not meet its potential. The patent-
ing rate is about average for the nation: 5.3 patents per 10,000 
employees, ranking 41st among the largest 100 U.S. metros and on 
par with the U.S. average of 5.4. Translating new ideas into market-
ready products, however, may be constrained by too modest levels 
of technology transfer and licensing at many local universities, com-
pared to other large research institutions.88 In terms of new firm cre-
ation, the region is performing at below-average levels. While there 
are about 18% more firm births than deaths annually, the region 
ranks 55th among large metros on “business churn,” a measure of 
the dynamism and fluidity of the economy (firm births and deaths as 
a share of total establishments). Performance is particularly weak on 
the creation of mid-size establishments (those between 20 and 499 
employees) at a rate of 4.3 firms per 10,000 employees, ranking the 
region 92nd among the largest 100 metros.89 
How will the effects of GO TO 2040 on the regional economic land-
scape (as described in Chapter I) influence the factors which lead to 
innovation?  Innovation occurs largely through private sector activ-
ity. As indicated by the innovation research cited above, the recom-
mendations in GO TO 2040 will enhance the inputs to, environment 
for and processes of innovation and, as a result, enable greater firm 
growth and (consequently) greater economic growth across the 
region. At the same time, these recommendations are not deeply 
tailored to analysis of the particular types and stages of innovation 
which present current opportunities in the local economy — a key 
next step as implementation proceeds.
 
Human Capital 
GO TO 2040 includes extensive recommendations focused on in-
creasing human capital levels, essentially from cradle to grave (see 
Chapter I, Characteristic 3). As described above, higher levels of 
human capital lead to higher rates of innovation, and consequently 
increased productivity and economic growth. The plan’s recom-
mendations, or next steps toward implementation, might benefit 
from exploring in more targeted ways where the region stands with 
respect to specific types of human capital that contribute to innova-
tion in the key clusters possessing high potential for economic 
growth (see Chapter IV). Determining whether shortages exist in 
key skill sets — e.g., STEM degree holders, healthcare profession-
als, business and financial services specialists — will enable better 
tailoring of human capital development strategies to seize growth 
opportunities.
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Knowledge Networks and Spillovers 
GO TO 2040’s recommendations will increase the extent of informa-
tion sharing and cross-fertilization of ideas among organizations 
and individuals, creating the knowledge networks and spillovers 
that lead to higher rates of innovation (Chapter I, Characteristic 
3). In particular, the recommendations of fostering greater col-
laboration and enhanced exchange of ideas among firms, potential 
entrepreneurs, universities and other research organizations will 
provide significant new opportunities to share information related to 
commercial applications of research and avenues for taking them to 
market. Reviving the State of Illinois’ ITEC program could have a par-
ticularly meaningful impact on strengthening connections between 
the public, private and institutional realms to support the start-up 
business needs of emerging entrepreneurs.
It should be noted that the emphasis of GO TO 2040’s recommenda-
tion around knowledge networks and spillovers is primarily focused 
on the later stages of the innovation process — fostering relation-
ships that contribute to increased commercialization and entrepre-
neurship — rather than on the earlier stages.  Commercialization 
is generally a critical phase, and the quick “snapshot” indicators 
at the opening of this section on the current state of innovation in 
the region suggest it is a key area, but further analysis is necessary 
before limiting to this phase. As it moves toward implementation, 
CMAP may want to consider augmenting its innovation recommen-
dations to address strengthening of networks and idea exchange in 
the idea generation and concept testing stages,90 including particu-
larly between research institutions and the private sector.
The increased idea generation facilitated by knowledge networks 
can have a particularly significant impact on economic growth. For 
example, at least 50% of growth in U.S. gross national product be-
tween 1950 and 1993 has been attributed to increases in the “stock 
of ideas” produced by researchers.91 GO TO 2040’s recommendation 
to strengthen knowledge networks and facilitate knowledge spill-
overs should therefore lead to greater profits and output when new 




Institutional Environment and Culture 
GO TO 2040’s recommendations will also enhance the region’s insti-
tutional environment and culture for innovation (Chapter I, Charac-
teristic 3, as well as aspects of Characteristic 4, such as government 
coordination and better information). In combination, refocusing 
technology transfer programs on commercialization, creating 
more linkages between innovation competitions, conferences and 
organizations, publicizing local “success stories” and making better 
information available,92 among other suggestions, will help enhance 
the region’s attractiveness to innovators and entrepreneurs, and 
support their and the region’s success.
Moving forward, these actions could be more strategically focused 
in three ways. First, the recommendations related to improving com-
mercialization of technology might be more effective if they were 
delivered through a cluster-based framework (see Chapter IV). That 
is, because cluster-specific technical knowledge is often necessary 
in bringing new ideas to market, commercialization assistance may 
be more effectively delivered in ways that are tailored to the needs 
of particular clusters. Therefore, delivery through programs such as 
ITEC and IEN, while potentially beneficial to a subset of firms, may 
not provide assistance that is sufficiently specific to support some 
innovators. Several cluster-specific innovation organizations already 
exist in the Chicago region (e.g., iBio); leveraging these organiza-
tions’ knowledge and experience to implement GO TO 2040’s com-
mercialization recommendations may offer a greater chance  
of success.
Second, the innovation culture recommendations could be improved 
by increasing their specificity, which would require a deeper under-
standing of the cultural environment than is currently included in 
GO TO 2040. In particular, efforts should be made to interact directly 
with the business community to gain insight into both the innova-
tion opportunities in the marketplace, and the types of challenges 
they face in pursuing innovative activities within the region. Chal-
lenges may be very general (e.g., risk aversion, impatient capital) or 
related to particular stages of the innovation process. For instance, 
if stakeholders are encountering obstacles related to university 
technology transfer practices, access to facilities or expertise for 
proof-of-concept testing or funding and technical support for start-
up firms, appropriate interventions could be formulated to address 
the most critical stage-specific issues.
Finally, the GO TO 2040 recommendations could be enhanced by 
explicitly addressing the innovation needs of large firms, in addition 
to those of start-ups and small businesses. While these firms do not 
need assistance with “commercialization,” per se, they may also 
benefit from outside institutional relationships to support earlier 
stage R&D, product development and concept testing.
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Funding 
GO TO 2040 also addresses the funding inputs to innovation, includ-
ing specific matching grant, ITEC and venture capital recommenda-
tions (Chapter I, Characteristic 3). Better identifying and accessing 
existing funding and making more stage-appropriate funding (and 
technical assistance) available to researchers and aspiring entre-
preneurs will increase the likelihood that more products will reach 
the market and more new businesses will survive the earliest, most 
risky stages of development.
While GO TO 2040’s recommendations around venture capital fund-
ing will facilitate the commercialization of new technologies and 
creation of new businesses in the region, the plan does not make 
any specific recommendations regarding early-stage innovation 
funding. Stage-appropriate funding for pre-commercial research 
and development (e.g., basic and applied science) is necessary to 
generate a sufficient pipeline of ideas for commercialization. CMAP 
may want to consider further exploring the needs of earlier-stage 
researchers and innovators in the region, to determine whether 
additional funding programs or financing tools are warranted to sup-
port and enhance their work.
Implementation of the GO TO 2040 recommendations can be ex-
pected to improve the local innovation environment in several ways. 
National studies suggest that venture capital firms tend to invest 
twice as much locally, that industry-focused VC funds (such as the 
potential clean technology focus of the recommended local VC fund) 
are effective,93 and that VC-backed firms tend to outperform non-VC-
backed firms in terms of both job growth (1.6% versus 0.2%) and 
revenue growth (5.3% versus 3.5%).94 Empirical evidence further 
suggests that a doubling in the number of firms funded by local VC 
firms implies a 1.2% increase in the overall number of new estab-
lishments (of 0-19 employees), while doubling the supply of venture 
capital in the average region can result in a 1.4-6.4% increase in 
aggregate income.95 Increased presence of venture capital funds in 
the region can be expected to spur regional job creation as well as 
revenue and wage growth.
Overall, then, by enhancing human capital, knowledge networks and 
spillovers, the institutional and cultural environment and availability 
of appropriate funding, GO TO 2040 can be expected to substan-
tially increase technology commercialization and entrepreneurship 
activity in the regional economy. Additional attention to policies and 
programs that address early-stage innovation can further enhance 
the region’s innovation capacity. Deeper analysis of the types and 
stages of innovation that present the most opportunities in the 
context of the current regional economy should inform more tailored 
next steps. Increased innovation, in turn, will lead to growth and 
productivity gains for existing firms and the creation of new firms — 
the essence of regional economic growth.
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A. Definition and Significance
 
A cluster is a group of firms and related economic actors and in-
stitutions that are located near each other96 and “draw productive 
advantage from their mutual proximity and connections.”97 A cluster 
can consist of hundreds, and even thousands, of firms of various 
types and sizes — from Fortune 500 corporations and large profes-
sional service firms (advertising and accounting businesses, for 
instance) to highly specialized R&D operations and small supplier 
businesses — along with related entities such as business associa-
tions, research universities, community colleges, worker training 
providers and professional development entities that support and 
connect firms to each other. To constitute a cluster, these firms and 
institutions must be interdependent actors linked economically, 
socially and technologically within a region — a sort of production 
“ecosystem.”98 
Clusters reflect a form of agglomeration (see Chapter II, Section 
A): the member firms gain efficiency and productivity benefits 
from co-locating. Clustering is generally used to refer to concen-
trations of related economic activity that achieve more than the 
common economic benefits flowing to diverse, disconnected firms 
which share infrastructure and resources in a common geography 
(known as “urbanization economies”99). Instead, a cluster gener-
ally describes related firms and economic activities100  — those that 
interact through supply chains and competitive or other relation-
ships — whose geographic concentration and relationships reduce 
transportation and infrastructure costs, enable the sharing of labor 
and other inputs, may ease access to consumer markets, facilitate 
“knowledge spillovers” and the exchange of ideas among firms and 
enhance innovation (characteristics of “localization economies”101) 
— all leading to increased productivity of the firms in the cluster.102
The concept of localization economies has been common parlance in 
economic literature for quite some time, and conventional industry 
clusters have been recognized going back to the beginning of the in-
dustrial age. Michael Porter’s work brought the concept of economic 
“clusters” into the mainstream about 20 years ago. In 1990 he iden-
tified essential characteristics of what he defined as “geographic 
concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a 
particular field.”103 These included: linked industries, suppliers and 
specialized business infrastructure; distribution channels and cus-
tomers; companies with related skills and technologies; and related 
research organizations, universities, standard-setting organizations 
and training entities. Alternatively, Rosenfeld defines clusters as 
a “critical mass” of firms and related entities “that is sufficient to 
attract specialized services, resources and suppliers.”104 In the past 
20 years, much additional work has further identified the mecha-
nisms and competitive benefits of clustering.105 
Cluster analysts are looking particularly closely at the effect that 
advances in communications technologies are having on the impor-
tance of physical proximity for regional clusters. While many social 
observers predicted that the advent of the internet age would elimi-
nate the importance of physical proximity, the evidence is quite the 
opposite. The extensive face-to-face “gluing” that firms benefit from 
in regional clusters remains essential, because the benefits  
 
 
of clustering involve transmission of tacit knowledge and ideas that 
cannot be gleaned from codified literature or communicated over 
long distances. The in-person interaction within clusters more easily 
facilitates this type of informal learning among members, as well as 
the knowledge spillovers that occur through the firm-to-firm move-
ment of employees within a common labor pool.106 More broadly, 
as the cost of transporting goods has gone down, but the value of 
face-to-face interaction has gone up (including because of the shift 
toward a service economy), activities in the knowledge economy ap-
pear to favor the density of cities.107 
Recent evidence suggests that the emergence of a global and knowl-
edge-based economy is also affecting what economic activities 
most benefit from clustering. As transportation costs for goods have 
declined and the importance of interactions between the human 
capital embedded in firms and institutions has increased, regions 
are experiencing the emergence of new “functional” clusters that 
specialize in different parts of production processes.108 Functional 
concentrations, such as corporate headquarters, back-office or R&D 
capacities are thus becoming more important, as are occupational 
concentrations. In effect, agglomeration economies arise from the 
proximity of facilities that perform the same functions for different 
firms, rather than from the proximity of firms that operate in the 
same industry.109 As a result, firms previously organized as a single 
unit or vertically clustered within an industry may now tend to be-
come multi-unit organizations or benefit more from the co-location 
of horizontal functions. Units performing different functions then 
tend to locate in places where those functions are best supported 
(in terms of cost efficiencies and productivity factors). Specifically, 
Duranton and Puga maintain that firms tend to locate their head-
quarters in places that offer a wide array of business services, while 
production plants are moved to more sector-specialized cities.110 
An example of this trend is provided by the decision of the Boeing 
Company to move its corporate headquarters to Chicago, while its 
primary production facilities remain in Seattle.
Clusters drive regional economic growth through increasing firm 
productivity, leading to the growth of existing firms in the cluster, 
attraction of related firms to the region (since they will be more pro-
ductive if attached to a relevant cluster) and creation of new firms.  
Moreover, because cluster-based firms have productive advantages 
over competitors, these firms tend to achieve higher profitability 
and pay higher wages than non-cluster firms.111 
There are several caveats to this positive scenario for cluster effects 
in a region. One is that some clusters form in low-growth or low-
wage industries and simply cannot generate sufficient economic 
benefits from clustering to overcome general industry disadvantag-
es.  A second is that if just one or a few highly specialized industrial 
clusters dominate a region’s economy, it creates more risk if they 
decline (e.g., Detroit and automakers). Of course, a region can have 
multiple clusters, and so combine the benefits of diversity and spe-
cialization.112 Further, the cluster notion itself — already a complex 
concept encompassing an array of different types of concentrations, 
which are shifting as the economy changes — has become highly  
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popularized and diluted, such that it is often misapplied in identify-
ing and characterizing clusters. Analysis of clusters is a complex  
art requiring detailed engagement of the potential members of the 
cluster and “mapping” of the relationships and interdependencies 
to get any practical, actionable degree of reliability for particular 
local clusters.113 
What’s new about clusters is not their existence, but the realiza-
tion among economists, economic development practitioners and 
public policymakers that the framework provides a useful heuristic 
for understanding the local operations of the production side of the 
economy, and for pursuing regional economic growth by intention-
ally cultivating the emergence, growth and maintenance of special-
ized concentrations of economic activity. Through both theoretical 
and empirical research, a number of factors have been identified 
that contribute to cluster formation and success. These include, 
among others, Michael Porter’s four basic conditions for cluster 
formation114 and Cortright’s “micro-foundations” for clusters, based 
on a review of cluster-focused literature.115 
Identification of these factors, however, does not address the ques-
tions of what aspects of which clusters can be influenced, and how: 
how cluster-building processes that occur naturally as a result of 
individual firms operating in their own interests can be encouraged, 
affected or made more effective through conscious and explicit ef-
fort. The answer to this question continues to be intensely debated 
by academics, practitioners and public officials but there is agree-
ment that what can be done is, to some extent, limited,116 and that 
clusters are highly differentiated moving targets: appropriate ac-
tions will vary by cluster and throughout a given cluster’s lifecycle.117 
Nonetheless, there is a growing field of real-world practice from 
which to learn, and a number of specific “best practice” recommen-
dations for influencing key factors in cluster success.
Perhaps the most valuable lesson for practitioners and policymak-
ers is that development of clusters is quite different from traditional 
government economic development. The latter tends to focus on fi-
nancial subsidies for and recruitment of specific firms or on broadly 
creating a favorable “business climate” (in this usage, by compet-
ing on low cost), while the former builds upon existing strengths, 
primarily targeting collections of firms and economic activity rather 
than individual firms, and focuses on enhancing productivity (com-
peting on high value). Regions need to be cautious about trying to 
“pick winners” or build clusters without a sufficient existing core, 
but (as discussed further below, under “governance”) they can cre-
ate the conditions in which new clusters are more likely to material-
ize, and emerging clusters thrive.118 That is, practitioners and poli-
cymakers can undertake a variety of actions which at least reinforce 
the advantages of clustering, and the most effective actions will be 
highly place- and cluster-type-specific. Key aspects of this “menu” 
of potential strategies are highlighted below.119 Not by coincidence, 
this menu naturally organizes itself into a framework that largely 
reflects the leverage points identified in Chapter II: since clusters 
are a core component of the production side of the economy, and 
the leverage points are designed to enhance production, it would be 
expected that the leverage points would particularly enhance cluster 
formation and performance.120 
Foster Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
As discussed, clusters by their nature have natural advantages  
with respect to innovation. To facilitate cluster-based innovation, 
regions can co-invest with cluster firms and networks to sup-
port cluster-specialized applied research and product develop-
ment. Cluster-based innovation centers, driven by member firms 
and linked to local research universities, are an approach that is 
growing increasingly common at the regional level. For example, 
the research and development centers at several U.S. universities 
— Clemson University as well as the Universities of Alabama and 
Michigan — are linked directly to firms in their respective regions’ 
automotive clusters.  Internationally, the Stuttgart region is home to 
twelve Competence and Innovation Centers that act as innovation-
catalyzing intermediaries.121 
Similarly, studies of cluster development usually identify entrepre-
neurship — start-ups as well as spinouts from existing firms — as an 
important source of a cluster’s growth and performance.  Practi-
tioners and policymakers often provide cluster-specific support 
for entrepreneurs by increasing the availability of venture capital 
through investing in existing private venture firms already targeting 
and knowledgeable about specific clusters or, less often, by directly 
investing public funds in selected companies.122 Other entrepreneur-
ship strategies can also be adapted, and are often more effective 
when targeted to particular clusters: helping entrepreneurs network 
with and support each other within particular broader cluster 
networks; creating cluster specific, low-cost incubator space; and 
providing highly cluster specialized firm-driven technical assistance.
 
Enhance Connections in Existing and Emerging Clusters 
The vast majority of efforts to support regional clusters begin with 
some form of “mobilization strategy” through which emergence of 
a cluster-driven and -focused organization enables more deliber-
ate and strategic interaction among the firms in a cluster, identifies 
challenges and opportunities for cluster development, and pro-
vides a range of services, information and networking opportuni-
ties to meet needs identified by member firms.123 Establishing and 
strengthening links to organizations beyond the region can also 
be an investment in clusters’ innovative capacity (as well as lead 
to attraction of firms and human capital that would benefit from 
co-locating with the cluster), through exposure to trends, operat-
ing environments and cultures different from those in the clusters’ 
home region.124  
 
Develop and Deploy Human Capital Demanded By Clusters 
The local availability of specialized human capital — skills, knowl-
edge, know-how, expertise and creativity relevant to the cluster — 
matters enormously in cluster development. Regions can develop 
the capacity of local technical and community colleges, leverage 
government-funded “industry cluster centers” or establish cluster-
specific training to solve a cluster’s skill-related problems and 
generate a flow of trained workers.125 
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Improve Governance 
Local government first needs to shift focus from traditional, spe-
cific firm attraction strategies (e.g., “smokestack chasing”) toward 
targeted strategies that build from strengths in existing or potential 
clusters. Governments that want to build enduring relationships 
with clusters need to be flexible in their delivery of services and pro-
vision of assistance to firms. Traditional bureaucratic models of gov-
ernment fall short when dealing with agglomerations of firms that 
exhibit complex relationships and need to adapt quickly to changes 
in the global economy. Rather than trying to change the behavior of 
firms, as is often the approach, government entities would be better 
served by altering their own behavior — for example, organizing 
their service delivery around clusters or staffing key programs with 
employees who have cluster expertise.126 
A related issue in the field, which is often over-simplified or the 
subject of confusion, is whether government can or should “pick” 
clusters. Government provides foundational services and products 
(public goods) and creates a tax and regulatory environment that 
supports all firms, including the natural market emergence of clus-
ters. It can then make more targeted activities and support available 
to clusters which have emerged, attempting to do this in ways which 
build from, facilitate and support the organic market process, rather 
than distorting it. (Where specific clusters create positive social 
externalities — e.g., locate and create disproportionate employ-
ment opportunities in distressed areas — there may be justification 
for targeting government resources in ways that are more “distort-
ing” on the margins.) At the extremes, government cannot pick and 
generate a cluster out of nothing, nor need it refrain from making 
resources available to competitive clusters which have essentially 
picked and proven themselves. There is much complexity, and need 
for nuanced activity, in the middle, such as targeting policy and in-
vestments to build upon the region’s unique strengths and fostering 
an environment that enables the emergence of new clusters.127 
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B. Impacts of GO TO 2040 Recommendations
 
In the course of developing the recommendations contained in GO 
TO 2040, CMAP has conducted preliminary analysis which identifies 
a set of eleven clusters based on concentration in the region, em-
ployment growth and potential (see figure on the following page). 
This preliminary identification is based on quantitative work (ap-
plying a nationally derived definition of what types of firms define 
particular clusters to data on firms in the region), and identifies the 
clusters in which the seven-county region has a greater concentra-
tion than the nation, on average.128 The identified clusters span a 
wide range of activities, including business and financial services, 
advanced materials, transportation and logistics, arts and entertain-
ment, chemicals and energy. The current state of information about 
each cluster varies and, as noted by CMAP,129 much further analysis 
will be necessary. This preliminary analysis does not yet develop a 
nuanced understanding of the extent to which and how each identi-
fied collection of firms really operates as a functional cluster, the 
challenges to and opportunities for growing the respective clusters, 
and so forth. This more detailed understanding and engagement of 
the members of the clusters will be necessary in order to develop 
targeted policies related to increasing cluster performance.
 
 
As this nuanced cluster analysis is an intensive and long-term 
exercise, GO TO 2040 necessarily recommends prioritizing further 
exploration and strategy development for the identified set of 
regional clusters. Because of their particular potential to have a 
positive impact on the region’s economy, four clusters have been 
preliminarily identified as among the first group for further research 
and action: freight/logistics, energy-efficiency goods and services 
and green energy, biomed/biotech and advanced manufacturing. 
Knowledge about and progress in the first two of these (freight/
logistics and energy-efficiency goods and services) are currently 
furthest along and highlighted in the assessment of impacts that 
follows. More importantly for purposes of this report, however, most 
of the GO TO 2040 recommendations address factors that will natu-
rally contribute to enhanced performance across nearly all clusters. 
The cross-cluster impacts and some of the cluster-specific impacts 
of GO TO 2040 are discussed below.
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Impacts Across All Clusters 
As mentioned above, it is not coincidence that the leverage points 
that support economic growth are virtually the same interventions 
that particularly enhance cluster performance. Since much of the 
nation’s economic growth occurs within clusters in different regions, 
policies that enhance economic growth usually support clusters 
(and vice-versa). The ways in which the GO TO 2040-driven changes 
to the economic landscape will enhance economic performance 
through each of these leverage points are the subjects of separate 
chapters in this report, so are only summarized briefly here.
	 •	 Foster Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
As discussed in Chapter IIIB, GO TO 2040 (particularly  
through the changes to the economic landscape described in 
Chapter I, Characteristic 3) will develop appropriate human 
capital, boost knowledge networks and spillovers, improve the 
local institutional environment and “innovation culture” and 
increase financial support for innovators and entrepreneurs. As 
discussed above, all of these changes will particularly benefit 
local clusters.
	 •	 Develop and Deploy Human Capital Demanded by Clusters 
As discussed in Chapter VIB, GO TO 2040 (particularly through 
the recommendations described in Chapter I, Characteristics 
3 and 5) will increase the local production of skilled workers 
aligned with local employer needs and will attract and retain 
workers through rich job pools (particularly employment oppor-
tunities created by cluster growth) and quality-of-life amenities. 
This kind of targeted employer-driven, high-quality human 
capital development aligned with job creation in existing and 
emerging clusters is key to strengthening clusters.
	 •	 Improve Governance 
As discussed in Chapter VIIB (particularly through the recom-
mendations described in Chapter I, Characteristic 4), GO TO 
2040 will increase the efficiency of local governments through 
increased coordination, cooperation and consolidation of 
services; balance tax and regulatory policies to deliver high-
value public goods at a tax cost that provides businesses with 
a strong “return on investment;” and improve both the quality 
and availability of information to public and private stakehold-
ers. In combination, these changes will enable more efficient 
and effective decision making and lower transaction costs for 
expanding market activity. In their implementation, some of 
these areas may yield results particularly productive for clus-
ters (such as, for example, if coordinated regulatory incentives 
translate to specific measures that support emergence of the 
building energy efficiency cluster). However, the governance 
recommendations are generally not yet defined specifically 
enough to enable prediction that they will particularly help 
clusters (beyond the ways in which they will enhance perfor-
mance of firms and the economy overall).
GO TO 2040’s recommendations in the areas described above 
will strengthen the region’s clusters, improving the performance 
of cluster firms and attracting new firms, thus driving economic 
growth. However, as noted, much more detailed analysis — includ-
ing the more “anthropological” engagement of firms in the clusters 
to understand what firms and activities really constitute each cluster 
and their dynamics — is necessary to develop more cluster-specific 
strategies. Currently, the plan’s treatment of clusters – and, in 
fact, of the production side of the economy more broadly — is quite 
minimal: it is included as a subset of the innovation chapter and 
provides little direction on specific strategies.130 A critical next step, 
which is in fact one of GO TO 2040’s implementation areas, will be 
to support this kind of analysis, engagement and development of 
cluster-specific strategies.
How much difference will strengthening local clusters make to  
the regional economy? Empirical research confirms that firms 
located in clusters tend to have higher productivity levels (output 
per worker), which translate into regional economic growth through 
both higher firm output and higher wages for workers. For ex-
ample, one such study finds that manufacturing cluster workers in 
metropolitan areas earn an average wage premium of 6.2% above 
non-cluster manufacturing workers.131 A second study measures 
clustering in terms of manufacturing industry and occupational 
specialization (share of metropolitan employment in a given type of 
manufacturing) and concentration (metropolitan share of national 
industry or occupational employment). The authors find that a  one-
percentage-point increase in industry specialization yields workers 
in that industry a 2.8% gain in wages, while a similar increase in 
occupational specialization earns workers in that occupation 3.7% 
higher wages. A one percentage-point increases in industry and oc-
cupational concentration yields wage increases of 0.59% and 1.5%, 
respectively.132 Additionally, there is evidence that specialization 
in some service industries also raises real metropolitan wage per 
worker.133 A key reason wages are higher in local clusters is because 
the firms, and workers, have higher productivity levels due to the 
benefits of the cluster.
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Illustrative Cluster-Specific Impacts: Freight and Logistics 
Freight transportation and logistics is a well-established and impor-
tant cluster to Chicago’s regional economy. Since the advent of the 
railroad era in the mid-nineteenth century, the Chicago region has 
been among the most significant freight hubs in North America.134   
The region’s transportation history, market size and central location 
contributed to a strong network of rail and road infrastructure, which 
in turn gave rise to supporting facilities and services such as rail 
terminals, intermodal transfer facilities, distribution and warehous-
ing facilities and transportation logistics and coordination services.  
As of 2007, the Chicago metropolitan area was home to more than 
7,500 firms in the transportation and warehousing industries, a 
concentration of more than 25% above the national average.135 
GO TO 2040 recognizes the freight and logistics cluster as one of 
the most important to the region’s economic growth and prosperity.  
However, its current high-level analysis of industry concentrations, 
while a valuable first step for identifying regional industries for 
further exploration, does not yet provide a sufficiently nuanced un-
derstanding of the cluster’s operation for developing cluster-specific 
strategies. The “drill-down” anticipated in CMAP’s Implementation 
Action Areas136 will help develop a more in-depth picture of how the 
cluster operates and what it needs to prosper.
At a more basic level, however, the quality of the region’s infrastruc-
ture will of course be particularly important to the performance of 
this concentration of firms in freight and logistics services. As a 
result, the GO TO 2040 recommendations to improve the region’s 
road and rail infrastructure (see Chapter I, Characteristic 1) — while 
not explicitly a cluster-specific strategy — will particularly facilitate 
improved performance of the freight and logistics cluster. Currently, 
cluster firms’ performance is challenged by congestion of rail and 
roadways.137 The effects of congestion are twofold. First, conges-
tion increases the average time spent travelling per trip — this has 
a straight-line impact on costs. Congestion also, however, affects 
the variability of the amount of time spent travelling per trip. This 
decreases the efficiency with which vehicles can be deployed (fewer 
trips can be made within a given timeframe); increases time vehicles 
spend idling, increasing fuel consumption and costs; and increases 
delivery delays that can cut into transportation firms’ revenue and 
profit margins. Delayed deliveries also cause negative impacts down-
stream for warehouses and distribution facilities, and local trucking 
companies awaiting shipments for intra-regional distribution.138 
Enhancing the performance of the freight and logistics cluster will 
contribute substantially to economic growth in the region both 
directly through growth in the cluster itself and because of the ben-
efits which a strong freight and logistics cluster confer on all firms 
and industries in the region that rely on these services (part of the 
“urbanization economies” discussed above). Strength in this cluster 
particularly contributes to the capacity of firms to expand to meet 
the demands of the “next economy,” characterized by a number 
of economists, policy makers and thought leaders as increasingly 
export-driven.139 While the extensive GO TO 2040 recommendations 
to improve road and rail infrastructure will support all clusters, they 
will have a particularly meaningful impact on this cluster by increas-
ing cluster firms’ efficiency and productivity through more stream-
lined and reliable freight movements.
Illustrative Cluster-Specific Impacts:  
Energy-Efficiency Goods and Services 
The market for “green” goods and services is rapidly growing  
locally, nationally and globally, and building retrofitting in  
particular is emerging as a high-growth segment of the broader 
green marketplace. Promoting energy-efficiency goods and  
services is a significant focus of one of GO TO 2040’s recommenda-
tions (Chapter I, Characteristic 3), which encourages retrofitting of 
buildings for energy and water efficiency and sustainably designed 
new construction.
The trend toward “greening” the activities of businesses  
and households will be a key characteristic shaping the next  
economy.140   Beyond supporting the principles of resource conser-
vation and environmental sustainability, the emphasis on greening 
is giving rise to whole new sectors of economic activity. While the 
outlines and definitions of these emerging sectors are still tak-
ing shape, they broadly include, among others, alternative energy 
production (e.g., wind farms, fuel cells, solar panels); new energy 
distribution and management systems (e.g., smart grid); production 
of more energy efficient goods (e.g., florescent light bulbs, better 
insulation); development of more energy efficient processes across 
the economy (e.g., goods and processes reducing industrial waste); 
and energy-efficiency retrofitting of residential, commercial and 
industrial buildings.141 
Of these emerging sectors, retrofitting residential and commercial 
buildings is anticipated to be particularly large, and the Chicago 
region is well positioned to develop a strong cluster engaged in and 
supporting this activity. An active network of private, civic and pub-
lic institutions has created the Chicago Climate Action Plan (CCAP), 
developed a Chicago Retrofit Strategy and is creating the products, 
services and “ecosystem” to support emergence of this cluster at 
scale. Market based activities, along with state and local policies, 
will generate substantial local demand supporting emergence of this 
cluster,142 and CMAP is working with regional partners to develop 
and implement a large-scale, comprehensive retrofitting strategy — 
the Chicago Region Retrofit Ramp-Up (CR3) Program — with a heavy 
focus on supporting emergence of the private retrofit market.143 
Achieving only the residential retrofitting goal expressed in the 
CCAP — 400,000 residential units in the City of Chicago alone – 
would generate economic activity upwards of $2 billion.144 This 
activity translates into substantial job creation. For example, a 
recent study by Duke University forecast that if the southern region 
of the U.S. implemented nine “green” policies — including new ap-
pliance standards, retrofitting and weatherization and upgrades to 
utility plants — approximately 520,000 new jobs would be created 
by 2030.145 
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Further, businesses providing retrofit-related goods and services 
in the Chicago region may also be able to benefit from being “first 
movers” in the national, or possibly even international, retrofitting 
market.146 Being at the forefront of the retrofitting market could pro-
vide businesses a crucial foothold in a very high-potential industry, 
as they gain valuable experience quickly and on a large scale, given 
the size of the regional market and variety of building types. This 
experience could then be leveraged as a competitive advantage 
in pursuing further retrofitting goods and services opportunities 
throughout the U.S. or internationally.147 
Beyond the services needed to implement the region’s retrofitting 
goals, growth of the retrofit cluster includes, overlaps with or will 
support emergence of related economic activity (particularly for the 
goods that support the retrofits). Retrofits can include a combina-
tion of improvements to the building envelope, heating and cooling 
systems, hot water systems and lighting,148 all of which provide 
significant opportunity for businesses in metropolitan Chicago not 
only to provide the direct retrofit audit and contracting services, but 
also to supply a wide range of goods (such as tools, building materi-
als and components). A study of the Chicago economy by Bain and 
Company found that the region has a competitive advantage, both in 
terms of current capacity and future potential, in green construction 
materials and services.149 The demand that would accompany full-
scale implementation of a regional retrofit strategy could serve to 
accelerate the growth of existing components of the green building 
and retrofitting industry, catalyze the transition of older-line indus-
tries into this high-growth field and spur entry of new firms.
Managing and conserving resources through promotion of building 
retrofits and sustainable design, as recommended in GO TO 2040, 
is obviously a well-chosen target for cluster-focused activity. CMAP 
recently led a collective effort of the emerging retrofit network which 
resulted in receipt of a $25 million Energy Efficiency Block Grant to 
support retrofit market development and implementation activi-
ties (CR3, mentioned above). The retrofit ramp up strategies are 
designed to support market emergence and cluster development 
through increasing demand, reducing transaction costs, improving 
the labor force, providing financing and other initiatives tailored to 
the building energy efficiency cluster. In short, this is an emerging 
cluster with vast potential that is poised to take off, and CMAP is 
already helping launch it.
More generally (beyond the work on these two clusters), as men-
tioned, the initial cluster analysis conducted by CMAP is a solid 
foundation on which to begin exploring the region’s other clusters. 
The work conducted to date — analyzing relative concentration of 
particular industry groupings within the region — does not, how-
ever, provide sufficient information to drive strategic cluster-based 
policies and investment. A more nuanced — “anthropological” — 
analysis should be conducted, beginning with the highest-priority 
clusters, to determine which concentrations are truly operating as 
clusters within the region, precisely how they are operating and 
what opportunities for growth and intervention they offer. The initial 
quantitative analysis done by CMAP defines clusters based on na-
tional trend data about which types of firms tend to do business  
 
with each other, and then identifies the concentration of those col-
lections of firms in the Chicago region. The analysis does not, how-
ever, examine whether firms in the Chicago area actually interact 
with each other in the ways indicated by national trends, or whether 
and what kind of variations appear in local practice. The next analyt-
ical step entails teasing out the potential clusters’ specific member 
firms, and more importantly, determining the nature of the firms’ ac-
tual economic relationships with one another and local government, 
civic and other institutions. This “cluster mapping” (identified in GO 
TO 2040 Implementation Action Areas as a “drill down” analysis) 
and understanding of the dynamics operating in a given cluster is 
the critical input to identifying high potential clusters and develop-
ing effective strategies for enhancing cluster performance.
Overall, the recommendations included in GO TO 2040 will facili-
tate growth of the region’s existing clusters, as well as emergence 
of new, high-growth-potential clusters that build on the region’s 
existing assets. GO TO 2040 is focused on the factors that matter 
to cluster performance — and on several of the clusters that mat-
ter most — and high cluster performance directly translates into a 
stronger economy.
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A. Definition and Significance
 
While efforts to drive regional economic growth typically focus 
primarily on the question of what economic activity characterizes a 
particular region (e.g., its industry and occupation mix, innovation 
capacity), increasing attention in recent years has been paid to the 
geographic organization of this activity.150 As discussed in Chapter 
II, from an economic point of view, the very reason cities exist is to 
realize the agglomeration benefits occurring as the result of concen-
trating economic activity, specifically the reduction in transportation 
costs between firms and their suppliers, workers and consumers. 
Places that offer geographic proximity, density and accessibility 
among economic actors thus provide a more efficient arrangement 
of economic activity, resulting not only in lower transportation 
costs, but also facilitating shared labor pools, knowledge spillovers, 
increased innovation and other benefits that increase the productiv-
ity and efficiency of the regional economy.151 Alternatively, an inef-
ficient geographic arrangement of economic activity would result in 
high personal and freight travel times due to, for example, sprawl, 
traffic congestion, or the physical distance between economic ac-
tors. The term “spatial efficiency,” then, is used here to characterize 
the spatial configuration of economic inputs and activities within a 
region, drawing attention to the effect it has on the performance of 
the regional economy.
The spatial efficiency of a region can be described primarily in terms 
of three types of economic relationships: worker-to-employer; 
business-to-business; and business-to-consumer.152 It is likely that 
the optimal spatial distribution of these economic actors is highly 
nuanced and specific to a given region’s size and mix of economic 
activity. Adding to the complexity of the issue, there are trade-offs 
between various aspects of spatial efficiency, as well as between 
spatial efficiency and other values such as quality of life or environ-
mental health.153 For example, improving the spatial efficiency of 
business-to-business interactions may negatively affect business-
to-consumer or business-to-worker interactions. At the extreme, 
while it might reduce transportation costs for workers to live in fac-
tories, or for manufacturers to be located next to their retail outlets, 
these physical arrangements may impose negative externalities on 
households or society more broadly. Thus, optimizing spatial ef-
ficiency is complicated in its application; however, it is clear — and 
becoming clearer as people and firms increasingly prefer the density 




A spatial mismatch between the locations of jobs and of the hous-
ing where workers live can negatively impact economic growth 
through higher costs for both firms and workers, reduced labor 
market efficiency and increased social costs associated with the 
concentration of poverty.155 Low-density development that exhibits 
a largely single-use zoning pattern — housing separate from retail, 
services and public facilities, particularly what is often referred to as 
“sprawl” — or development that excludes affordable housing from 
areas where jobs are available, increases transportation costs for 
commuters traveling to employment centers. In addition, the quality 
of the infrastructure, the availability of public transit and levels of 
congestion all affect workers’ travel times and costs. Because travel 
time is one of the largest transportation costs for commuters, often 
worth more than the monetary costs of travel-related expenses, 
including gas, maintenance, and other operating costs,156 employers 
may face higher labor costs in regions that exhibit spatial mismatch. 
For example, one study of the value commuters place on their time 
indicates that workers who travel about 45 minutes roundtrip to and 
from work would need to earn nearly 20% more money than they 
currently do to feel fully compensated.157 
In addition to imposing time-consuming, costly commutes on 
workers, congestion and inaccessible transit also directly affect 
employers through the costs associated with increased employee 
turnover, absenteeism and lost worker productivity. A study of the 
Chicago region estimated that, in the absence of a dense and reli-
able transit network, the turnover costs to employers can add up to 
$200 to $300 million annually, with the burden especially heavy on 
businesses that hire large numbers of entry-level workers, who are 
especially sensitive to transportation costs.158 
Further, spatial mismatch of workers and employers contributes to 
reduced access by employers to workers with desired skills and by 
individuals to jobs for which they are qualified. This can result in 
workers in jobs that do not fully utilize their skills and education or, 
in more extreme cases, otherwise employable individuals remaining 
unemployed.159 On the personal level, this causes erosion of human 
capital and disenfranchisement from the labor market. On the ag-
gregate level, it introduces inefficiency into the labor market in the 
form of underutilized human capital. Efficient utilization of the labor 
force is of vital importance to the region’s economic growth: those 
regions that waste the fewest assets — human or otherwise — gener-
ally experience the highest levels of growth.160 
Finally, worker-employer spatial mismatch also reflects and con-
tributes to concentrations of urban poverty.161 Many of the potential 
workers who cannot afford to live near jobs can only find housing in 
inner-city areas, and have lower incomes and car ownership rates.  
If jobs continue to be disproportionately created in the suburbs,162  
while affordable housing remains primarily in the inner city, willing 
workers cannot reach available jobs, causing inefficiencies in the 
job market.163 While good public transit service can help alleviate 
this problem, it is often insufficient, particularly during the off-peak 
hours often worked by low-skilled workers,164 posing further chal-
lenges to those unable to afford to buy and maintain an automo-
bile.165   
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The absence of accessible public transit contributes to the economic 
isolation of inner cities, even cities in fast-growing regions, which 
impairs income gains and reductions in poverty.166 Many of the 
social costs induced by economic isolation, such as crime and urban 
blight, have a ripple effect, increasing costs of government, while 
negatively impacting other economic activity (such as a disincentive 
to firm location), thus perpetuating a cycle of urban decline.167 
 
Business-to-Business 
To successfully compete, businesses need to transport goods, em-
ployees and ideas within and between their own offices and to other 
businesses up and down their supply chains, both within the region 
and outside of it. The time and money required to do so affect both 
their costs of production and, in some cases, the extent to which 
they are able to capitalize on agglomeration benefits. These trans-
portation costs, as with those present in the business-to-worker re-
lationship, are a function of both distance and travel time, affected 
by factors such as quality of infrastructure and levels of congestion.
Congestion levels are increasing in most metropolitan areas, and 
have resulted in lost productivity for firms through delayed delivery 
of raw materials and intermediate goods. Congestion also increases 
fuel usage, further enlarging the transportation component of firms’ 
production costs.168 More broadly, if the benefits of density are what 
lead to concentration of economic activity in cities, it is the ensuing 
congestion costs as density increases which present one limiting 
factor explaining why economic activity spreads out at all, within 
and beyond cities.169 Minimizing transportation times and transpor-
tation trip-time variance170 between businesses contributes to the 
enhancement of regional economic efficiency and productivity.
Reducing the distance to be traveled, through co-locating busi-
nesses in smaller geographies, can also improve the productivity 
and efficiency of firms. While most studies demonstrate the benefits 
of co-locating firms at a metropolitan level — from shared infrastruc-
ture, labor market pooling and knowledge spillovers — smaller con-
centrations particularly of knowledge-intensive sectors or functions, 
such as Research Triangle Park, may heighten these benefits by 
even further reducing transportation costs and enabling face-to-face 
interaction.171 Generally, transportation costs can be reduced and 
agglomeration benefits enhanced by enabling firms to locate near 
their suppliers and key institutional partners (such as universities); 
by removing regulatory barriers (e.g., zoning restrictions); by provid-
ing special infrastructure (e.g., planned manufacturing districts); 
and by improving the regional transportation system.
 
Business-to-Consumer 
Finally, the distance between retail firms and their consumers, and 
the quality of the infrastructure that connects them, affects the 
transportation component of businesses’ costs of production as 
well as consumers’ costs of consumption. Congestion, for example, 
through delivery delays and increased costs of the delivery of 
finished goods to the market, increases firms’ production costs.  
On the consumer side, higher transportation costs leave individu-
als and households with less disposable income than they would 
otherwise be willing and able to spend on goods and services. From 
an economic perspective, then, transportation costs can reduce the 
number and type of economic transactions that occur by simultane-
ously increasing the costs of production and reducing consumers’ 
willingness (or ability) to pay.  
In general, transportation costs can be reduced through minimizing 
the distances between businesses and consumers by increasing 
dense mixed-use development, and through reducing travel times 
by managing congestion. This entails pedestrian-friendly communi-
ties, well-connected street networks, strengthening of public transit 
and full-cost pricing of transportation infrastructure. Specifically, 
land use patterns that support non-auto modes of transportation 
(transit, biking and walking) will reduce residents’ reliance on pri-
vate auto travel.172 Combined with transit accessibility, a mixed-use 
pattern of development can decrease the number and length of trips 
that residents must take, through the geographic concentration of 
key activities and destinations.173 Further, congestion — especially 
during peak travel periods — can be reduced by requiring drivers to 
pay directly for a greater portion of the true costs associated with 
use of various components of the regional transportation infrastruc-
ture. Various user fees, such as for highways and public parking, 
can alter the magnitude and time pattern of demand for those 
components for which users were previously paying what amounted 
to subsidized prices, reducing the number of vehicles on regional 
roadways.174 
Overall, spatial efficiency increases the economic output of a region 
by minimizing the transportation costs and enhancing the benefits 
of spatial proximity among workers, businesses and consumers via 
a dense, mixed-use land use pattern and efficient transportation 
infrastructure (including public transit) linking relevant economic 
actors to one another.
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The Chicago region’s performance on measures of spatial efficiency 
— both congestion and jobs-housing mismatch — leaves significant 
room for improvement. In terms of congestion, the region is among 
the most congested in the nation: third highest person-hours of traf-
fic delays and second highest travel time index (ratio of peak-period 
travel time to free-flowing travel time).175 This level of congestion 
costs the region approximately $7.3 billion annually in wasted time 
and fuel, an impact that is anticipated to become even more severe 
in the years ahead.176 The region is also home to the two most con-
gested freight-significant highway locations in the nation, as well as 
two other locations among the 100 locations monitored,177 contribut-
ing to congestion costs for freight shippers of more than $1 billion 
per year.178 
In terms of the relative locations of housing and employment oppor-
tunities, the region ranks 77th among the nation’s 100 largest metro 
areas for housing affordability,179 and nearly 69% of residents travel 
more than 10 miles to their places of employment. The region’s 
fastest-growing employment centers are separated from a signifi-
cant share of housing affordable to families earning the region’s 
median income,180 and existing transit service to suburban Chicago 
job centers and secondary central city neighborhoods is relatively 
poor.181 
In other words, the Chicago region needs to pay attention to spa-
tial efficiency. Fortunately, the Plan does. The recommendations 
articulated in GO TO 2040 will improve the spatial efficiency of the 
Chicago region and address the inefficiencies of the economic inter-





Minimize Transportation Costs 
Overall, the recommendations in GO TO 2040 that address transpor-
tation and the built environment (Chapter I, Characteristics 1 and 2) 
will reduce transportation costs, and therefore enhance economic 
growth, by geographically concentrating investments in the built 
environment and by improving transportation infrastructure,182 
decreasing the need to travel via private auto,183 providing increased 
access to efficient and reliable public transit and managing traffic 
flow on high-demand roadways and during peak travel times.
The recommended improvements to the region’s freight rail and 
road infrastructure (Chapter I, Characteristic 1) will decrease the 
cost of moving goods between businesses and from businesses 
to consumers. The region’s more than $371 billion in annual gross 
product184 and consumer market of 8.6 million residents185 make it 
both a point of origin and a destination for large volumes of interme-
diate and final goods. A modernized freight infrastructure network 
will mitigate the significant costs of congestion that are currently 
faced by local firms — including those related to the high variance 
in travel times — and that are expected to grow in the future if left 
unchecked.  Further, improving both rail and road networks offers 
regional firms the ability to adapt shipping and receiving patterns to 
their specific needs, using the most cost-effective mode of trans-
port.186 
The GO TO 2040 recommendations related to strategic investments 
in public transit (Chapter I, Characteristic 1) will decrease trans-
portation costs for individuals, particularly in their role as workers 
commuting to their places of employment. Commuting accounts 
for the bulk of the region’s congestion-related costs ($5.1 billion 
of the $7.3 billion estimated total187), as many workers not only live 
outside the communities in which they work, but more than 70% 
drive to work alone.188 Strategic investments in public transit will 
not only decrease these transportation costs to workers — allow-
ing for realization of personal cost-savings — but they will also 
lower the associated wage, lost productivity and turnover costs to 
businesses, thereby increasing profitability and facilitating firm 
growth. In addition to the specific infrastructure investments, the 
transportation financing mechanisms recommended by GO TO 2040 
(Chapter I, Characteristic 1) will contribute to economic growth by 
shaping the transportation decisions of households and businesses 
to make them more efficient, lowering per capita traffic congestion. 
These effects will lead to lower transportation costs for businesses 
and consumers as well as higher productivity, both of which will 
positively impact the region’s economic growth.
While additional investment in public transit will have a positive 
impact on the regional economy, GO TO 2040’s recommendation 
to explore the use of “value capture” mechanisms for its financ-
ing should be approached with caution, in order to avoid potential 
unintended negative consequences. Specifically, levying additional 
taxes or fees on transit-adjacent or transit-proximate properties, 
especially unimproved land, runs the risk of undermining efforts to 
promote affordable housing as part of transit-oriented development 
(unless the value captured is used for housing development subsi-
dies), so can aggravate the problem of jobs-housing mismatch.189     
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The impact of the transit-related recommendations made by GO TO 
2040 can be quite significant if effectively implemented. Small shifts 
from auto to transit, for example, can have a significant downward 
impact on auto travel, and consequently congestion, as measured 
by both reductions in vehicle miles traveled (VMT)190 and a decrease 
in the overall probability of driving.191 For example, a 10% increase 
in a city’s rail transit service has been found to result in a 40-to 70-
mile annual reduction in VMTs per capita.192 Similarly, an increase 
of one transit passenger-mile is associated with an annual VMT 
reduction of 1.9 to 9 miles per capita.193 Reductions in VMT translate 
to less roadway congestion, which will improve the efficiency and 
productivity of regional businesses, especially those that are heavily 
dependent on truck shipments,194 increasing economic growth.
User pricing of infrastructure, such as the mechanisms recommend-
ed in GO TO 2040, can also have a meaningful impact on economic 
growth. For example, London’s experience with congestion pricing 
finds that during the program’s first months, it resulted in a 20% 
decrease in private auto traffic. Some commuters who still elected 
to drive — including wealthy commuters and those with a dispropor-
tionately high value of time, such as businesses making deliveries 
— shifted their trips to off-peak hours, ultimately contributing to a 
37% increase in average traffic speed per day and a 30% decline in 
peak-period congestion delays.195 Additionally, U.S.-based studies 
have found that a $1.37 to $2.73 increase in on-site (i.e., at workers’ 
place of employment) parking fees reduced auto commuting by 12% 
to 39%. Similarly, differential parking fees for single- vs. high-occu-
pancy vehicles (i.e., carpools), combined with transit and rideshare 
subsidies, could reduce total auto trips by 19% to 31%.196 Thus, 
congestion pricing and increased parking fees represent practical 
methods by which to reduce levels of congestion.
However, it is worth noting that the use of infrastructure pricing 
mechanisms to manage the flow of traffic is a complex undertaking, 
with the potential for unintended negative consequences if the right 
balance is not achieved. Prioritizing public infrastructure for use by 
those most able to pay (i.e., businesses and more wealthy resi-
dents) may create situations in which individuals who must travel 
by car are unable to pay the higher auto-related user fees.197 These 
circumstances would decrease spatial efficiency to the extent that 
lower-income residents’ access to employment, education and other 
opportunities are constrained, decreasing the efficiency of labor 
markets and levels and productivity of human capital. A similar logic 
applies to certain businesses.
 
Finally, GO TO 2040’s recommendations regarding the region’s built 
environment (see Chapter I, Characteristic 2) will also contribute to 
reducing per capita traffic congestion and consequently transporta-
tion costs. The recommendations will help to reduce “sprawl” — or 
conversely, increase the density of development — which translates 
into growth in economic output and income. For example, doubling 
county-level density is associated with a 6% increase in state-level 
labor productivity,198 and neighborhoods with the most intercon-
nected, grid-based street networks result in 26% fewer vehicle miles 
traveled by residents, when compared to  less-connected neighbor-
hoods.199 Similarly, a study that modeled the hypothetical impact 
of moving sample households from a city with measures of urban 
form and transit supply identical to those of Atlanta, to a city with 
measures equivalent to those of Boston, found that the differences 
in measures such as public transit supply, city shape and population 
centrality could lead to a 25% net reduction in annual VMTs.200 
 
Maximize Agglomeration Benefits 
In combination, the transportation and built environment recom-
mendations of GO TO 2040 (Chapter I, Characteristics 1 and 2) can 
be anticipated to enhance the agglomeration benefits to firms by 
better connecting them to one another and to a range of shared 
inputs to production. As a common resource shared by all firms, the 
transportation infrastructure upgrades will enhance “urbanization 
economies” within the region, improving firm performance across a 
diverse range of firms. The freight infrastructure recommendations 
will provide better access to firms’ supply chains and customers, 
while improvements to the public transit system put a deeper pool 
of labor within reach of local firms.
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Avoid Segregation and Concentration of Poverty 
The transit and land use recommendations included in GO TO 2040 
(Chapter I, Characteristics 1 and 2) promote the socioeconomic 
inclusion that facilitates deployment of all the region’s economic 
assets. Encouraging communities to become more mixed-use, 
mixed-income and transit-accessible will make job opportunities, as 
well as basic goods and services, more accessible to minority and 
low-income workers and make qualified workers more accessible to 
potential employers. These types of communities will enable more 
efficient deployment of the region’s workforce by facilitating fuller 
participation in the labor market.
While the transit and land use recommendations will enable all 
workers to better match their residential and workplace locations 
to take advantage of dense neighborhoods with transit access, they 
may particularly benefit low-income households in the region. Rec-
ommendations that provide opportunities to live in neighborhoods 
that were previously beyond their financial means and investments 
that make public transit a more viable commuting option will link 
low-income workers to the job centers and educational institutions 
that would otherwise be beyond their geographic reach. This will 
facilitate more efficient deployment of this under-utilized segment 
of the regional workforce.
 
GO TO 2040’s land use and housing recommendations could go 
further, however, toward addressing the spatial mismatch of jobs 
and housing. The magnitude and impact of this issue are identi-
fied in many places throughout plan,201 but recommendations that 
relate to facilitating a more balanced distribution of housing options 
throughout the region are primarily process-based: funding for com-
prehensive planning and technical assistance; inter-governmental 
coordination; and policymaking that link transportation, land use 
and housing. The recommendations emphasize local control over 
land-use decisions and the need for context-specific solutions for 
incorporating affordable housing. These points are legitimate and 
important, but do not preclude the provision of — or acknowledge 
the need for — a regional economic framework and particular 
programs with which to understand and address the mismatch of 
jobs and housing. Going forward, offering evidence of the economic 
benefits of addressing the mismatch, and recommendations and 
implementation assistance with respect to the types of policies and 
programs that communities can implement to address it — from 
employer-assisted housing to density bonuses for new develop-
ments providing affordable units — would be valuable contributions 
to the regional economy.
Overall (and not surprising, considering CMAP’s origins), the GO 
TO 2040 recommendations with respect to transportation and 
land use (Chapter I, Characteristics 1 and 2) are among the plan’s 
strongest, and reflect more detailed and specific projects which will 
considerably improve the spatial efficiency of the region by reduc-
ing transportation costs for businesses and households, increasing 
agglomeration benefits to businesses and reducing segregation and 
concentration of poverty. These impacts will facilitate greater eco-
nomic growth in the region, as inputs and exchange of labor, goods 
and ideas will occur more efficiently and at lower costs.
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A. Definition and Significance
 
Labor is one of the main inputs to economic production, and exten-
sive work has documented the primary importance of the quality of 
labor, or human capital, to economic growth.202 Human capital refers 
to the stock of knowledge, skills and expertise embedded in the 
labor force.203 Workers acquire human capital through formal educa-
tion and training, on-the-job training, work experience and other 
forms of learning, which when deployed in a job, leads to increased 
levels of labor productivity. As a result, economies with larger total 
stocks of deployed human capital experience more and faster gains 
in productivity and, by extension, economic growth.204 
In the context of technology development, globalization and other 
facets of the “knowledge economy,”205 economic productivity has 
become even more reliant on human capital. While higher levels of 
human capital lead directly to productivity gains, as well as innova-
tion and entrepreneurship,206 the interaction of human capital and 
technology further amplifies productivity, as higher-skilled workers 
take better advantage of new technologies. This interaction gener-
ates additional technological change, further compounding the pro-
ductivity of the labor force. As a result, the value of output per U.S. 
worker has increased more than ten-fold over the last century.207 Due 
in part to these dynamics, human capital (as measured by educa-
tional attainment) was the single biggest driver of economic growth 
in metropolitan areas across the 1990s.208 
In the knowledge economy, the benefits of concentrating economic 
activity in metropolitan economies apply particularly to concentrat-
ing human capital. Skilled workers deployed in dense, urban areas 
generate more economic output than similarly skilled workers in 
less dense areas.209 This advantage is derived from two principal 
effects. “Knowledge spillover” effects arise as knowledgeable, ex-
perienced workers interact with each other and move between firms, 
exchanging and generating new knowledge.210 In addition, thick 
labor markets enable more efficient sorting of workers into jobs, 
resulting in better firm-worker matches.211 For all of these reasons, 
human capital was the single biggest correlate of economic growth 
in metropolitan areas across the 1990s.212 Regions with higher levels 
of human capital experience greater increases in worker productiv-
ity,213 wages and employment growth.215  
The prevalent and compelling statistical research linking high levels 
of human capital, generally measured by educational degrees, to 
high levels of metropolitan economic performance has often led 
practitioners to conclude that simple production of more human 
capital will lead to economic growth. However, it is not simply in-
creasing levels of human capital which causes economic growth. To 
do economic development, we need to understand the operational 
relationship between human capital and growth.
 
 
Human capital contributes to economic growth as an input to 
production. Increasing amounts and levels of human capital drive 
growth by increasing the productivity of firms and, consequently, 
their output. The key point is so obvious that it is often overlooked: 
human capital contributes to growth by being deployed in jobs.  
For similar reasons — because workers go to places where their 
skills can be well deployed — jobs are also critical to retaining and 
attracting human capital. From an economic growth point of view, 
simply having a high level of human capital is not sufficient: the goal 
is high levels of well-deployed human capital. This means that, in 
order to maximize development and deployment of human capital, 
practitioners have to focus on the complex relationships between 
(1) production, attraction and retention of human capital; (2) job 
creation through firm growth, attraction and retention; and (3) the 
structure and efficiency of labor markets.
In exploring how best to maximize development and deployment of 
human capital, we begin by addressing several common misconcep-
tions. In short, it turns out that the mechanisms for developing hu-
man capital (production, attraction and retention), and particularly 
for deploying it well, are much more a function of creating the right 
job pools and of labor market dynamics, than just of the educational 
systems which produce human capital or the quality-of-life ameni-
ties which contribute to its retention and attraction.  
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Misconception #1: Producing more and higher levels of human  
capital is itself the primary cause of economic growth. 
As discussed, regions with higher levels of human capital gener-
ally experience greater economic growth. However, the necessary 
mechanism through which human capital realizes its economic 
value is by increasing the labor productivity of workers employed in 
jobs, through increased levels of innovation, better use of technol-
ogy, knowledge spillovers and so on. Deployment in occupations 
that effectively leverage workers’ skills is the mechanism through 
which capability is converted into increased productivity and, conse-
quently, economic growth.  
As a result, two metropolitan economies may have the same amount 
and quality of human capital, but the one that offers rich job pools 
and more productively deploys workers’ skills and knowledge will 
experience greater economic growth. Consider for instance, “college 
towns,” which, not incidentally, are frequently statistical outliers in 
human capital research. While they have among the highest levels 
of human capital, they generally do not have the largest, most 
productive or highest-growth economies.216 The very high level of 
human capital embedded in professors is deployed for critically im-
portant purposes (such as production of human capital in students) 
other than maximizing its value in local economic growth.
Focusing on deploying human capital is not to diminish the impor-
tance of strategies that strive to increase the production of human 
capital. As discussed below (see “Misconception #2”), firms and 
knowledge workers attract each other in an iterative and mutu-
ally reinforcing process — knowledge workers are attracted to rich 
pools of knowledge jobs, and firms, in turn, are attracted to rich 
pools of knowledge workers. For this reason alone (as well as many 
non-economic reasons), increasing production of human capital is 
never a mistake. The point, though, is that it is not enough to drive 
economic growth.
The fact that deployment is what counts for economic growth raises 
several other practical issues. In order to maximize impact on 
regional economic growth, it is not just that the skilled workers must 
have jobs, but that they must be engaged in occupations that most 
productively deploy their human capital. For example, if a newly 
minted PhD scientist works at the checkout counter of a grocery 
store, the regional economy fails to maximize his or her potential 
economic value-added, and the worker is unable to employ her 
knowledge and skills to maximize earnings. This may occur because 
of labor market inefficiencies, if for example labor is underemployed 
because transaction costs217 prevent efficient matching of workers 
and jobs. It may also occur because the jobs simply are not there. 
Both reasons entail, again, a need to also focus on the demand side 
of the labor market as well as the market’s efficiency if practitioners 
are to maximize deployment of human capital.
Misconception #2: Retaining and attracting high-skilled human 
capital is primarily achieved through improving quality-of-life and 
consumption amenities. 
Retaining and attracting human capital is a critical component of 
any comprehensive regional human capital strategy: if a region pro-
duces lots of human capital that then moves elsewhere, it of course 
does not get deployed in and contribute to growth of the regional 
economy. Similarly, if a region does not attract human capital, it 
cannot be deployed for economic growth.
A well-known body of research emphasizes the role of quality-of-life 
factors — such as access to quality performance venues and restau-
rants, tolerant attitudes and safety — in determining where high-
skilled workers218 choose to locate, and so suggests that the primary 
strategy for retaining and attracting them should be to improve 
amenities.219 While amenities do contribute to location decisions 
of knowledge workers, the magnitude of this impact is significantly 
smaller than the impact of the availability of high-skilled jobs and a 
thriving local economy.220 Knowledge workers have spent consider-
able resources and time acquiring skills and qualifications, and they 
seek to locate in metropolitan economies where they can effectively 
deploy their human capital and receive a high return on their skills, 
in the form of wages.221 More broadly, they look to locate in places 
that offer rich job pools in which they have a range of opportunities 
to deploy their talents, and accompanying rich pools of knowledge 
workers, benefiting from the ensuing knowledge spillovers and en-
hanced productivity.222 Amenities and other factors  are important, 
but jobs are much more important.223
In light of these dynamics, attracting and retaining skilled workers 
primarily depends on identifying, creating and enhancing the job 
pools necessary to effectively deploy their talents. As workers are at-
tracted to job pools that provide a strong return on their skills, firms 
are attracted to deep pools of high-quality human capital that can 
be productively deployed to increase firm performance. Firms and 
skilled workers thus attract one another in a mutually reinforcing, 
iterative process.224 This need to create a thriving knowledge-based 
economy requires that human capital strategies also encompass, or 
be closely linked to, strategies addressing the demand side of the 
market (discussed in other chapters, particularly Chapter IV, about 
enhancing local industry, functional and occupational concentra-
tions).225
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Misconception #3:  Formal educational attainment levels adequately 
reflect the human capital attributes that are most relevant to em-
ployers, and should be the primary focus of human capital-related 
economic growth strategies. 
Since educational attainment data sets are more readily available, 
and they may serve as a sufficient proxy for human capital in ag-
gregate statistical analyses, formal educational attainment (e.g., 
receipt of high school diploma, college or advanced degree) is a pri-
mary focus of the research on human capital. As these findings have 
been translated into practice, they often result in human capital 
development strategies focusing primarily on increasing formal edu-
cational degree attainment. In the real world, however, while formal 
education is an integral component of human capital development 
and is the basis for later skill attainment, it does not represent the 
sole — or perhaps even most significant — source of knowledge and 
skills contributing to labor productivity.
Workers also acquire and build skills through work experience, on-
the-job training, workforce development programs, mentoring and 
so on. This rich combination of formal and informal learning experi-
ences endows them with expertise and skills not produced by formal 
educational institutions, nor captured by educational attainment 
measures. This is particularly true, of course, for workers who have 
not gone through traditional educational institutions. As workers 
settle into a particular occupation, they acquire unique industry-
specific skills, which ultimately contribute to greater worker 
productivity over time.226 Additionally, “non-cognitive” skills such 
as motivation, discipline and perseverance, have been found to in-
crease productivity as much as, and sometimes more than, cognitive 
skills measured by traditional educational attainment.227 Employers 
understand the value of these other types of human capital and 
frequently rank “attitude” (i.e., non-cognitive skills), previous work 
experience and industry-based credentials above years of schooling 
when hiring new employees.228 These dynamics help explain why 
workers with the same amount of formal education exhibit almost 
as much variance in wages as individuals across the entire work-
force.229 Formal education is an important component but not the 
sole contributor to the complex mix of skills developed throughout a 
worker’s life and career that impact overall levels of productivity.  
Formal education provides the foundational knowledge and skills 
that shape later skill attainment in the workforce230 and significantly 
impact individual labor market outcomes.231 For particular jobs — 
especially highly technical ones — the skills and abilities conveyed 
by formal educational attainment are primary drivers of worker 
productivity. For these and many other reasons, promoting the 
highest levels possible of formal educational attainment is of course 
valuable. However, equally important human capital is attained in 
many other ways. As the knowledge-based economy advances a 
culture of lifelong learning, and job requirements increasingly call 
for constant upskilling of workers’ abilities, industry-specific and 
“non-cognitive” skills comprise an important part of continued skill 
development for both incumbent and emerging workers.
Therefore, strategies to develop human capital need to address not 
only the foundational skills acquired as part of formal education, but 
also the other skills that enable workers to be deployed in jobs that 
the region has and can grow. For purposes of maximizing devel-
opment and deployment of human capital for regional economic 
growth, this over-emphasis on formal degrees in both human capital 
production and hiring has two implications: (1) we may be underval-
uing and under-producing the industry-specific and non-cognitive 
human capital not obtained through degrees; and (2) to the extent 
potential employers cannot as readily find and evaluate this non-
degree based human capital, it is being less efficiently deployed. 
The discussions below concerning employer-driven training and 
enhancing labor market “matching” efficiency are both addressed to 
these issues.
The theme underlying each of these three misconceptions is that 
human capital cannot contribute to regional economic growth un-
less it is effectively deployed. And understanding the mechanisms 
through which human capital is developed and deployed requires 
broadening the focus well beyond college production and amenities 
to encompass strategies which foster and link skilled workers to rich 
and diverse pools of jobs.  
Clarifying these misconceptions to better understand the mecha-
nisms through which human capital translates to economic growth 
suggests three areas of strategies that regions can employ to more 
effectively develop and deploy human capital for economic growth: 
(1) increase levels of human capital through production, attraction 
and retention of skilled workers; (2) improve the efficiency of labor 
markets; and (3) foster an “opportunity rich” economy with a di-
verse mix of jobs for all skill levels, multiple entry points to the labor 
market and opportunities for upward mobility.
 
Production, Attraction and Retention 
Human capital production — from pre-school through worker re-
training and lifelong learning — of course remains critically im-
portant. The key point is that to increase regional levels of human 
capital in a way that maximizes economic impact, production strate-
gies should be (1) targeted to the particular needs and characteris-
tics of different segments of the population; and (2) targeted to the 
current and anticipated needs of employers. For incumbent workers, 
job seekers and the emerging workforce (i.e., students), strategies 
should address the critical need to increase educational attain-
ment levels, as well as to provide workers with continued access to 
education and training programs that produce the “right” human 
capital to meet the demands of local industries and employers. This 
demand-driven emphasis increases the likelihood of effectively 
deploying and better leveraging workers’ skills to increase labor 
productivity in the regional economy.
With the intense emphasis on attraction and retention of knowledge 
workers (discussed further below), strategies to upgrade and better 
utilize the skills of the existing and emerging workforce may be get-
ting less attention than they deserve: these strategies can equally 
contribute to increased productivity in the economy.232 Addressing 
human capital development of the emerging and existing work 
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force with a focus on improved labor market outcomes increasingly 
requires policies and programs that span from birth through the arc 
of a career. While strategies or reforms to improve the production of 
human capital within the formal educational system are well beyond 
the scope of this paper, a few observations follow.
The production of human capital begins with investments in early 
childhood, primary and secondary education, which lay the founda-
tion for subsequent educational and skill attainment.233 Research 
indicates that high-quality early-childhood education improves 
later school achievement and job performance, particularly among 
children at risk of school failure.234 Educational attainment at all 
levels (while, as discussed, not the only or necessarily most impor-
tant source of human capital) is critical to promoting positive labor 
market outcomes.235 A high school diploma is no longer sufficient to 
meet the skill requirements of today’s job market,236 and the lifelong 
learning culture of the knowledge-based economy frequently calls 
for workers to receive additional postsecondary education and train-
ing throughout their careers.
Comprehensive human capital development strategies must there-
fore promote post-secondary training and education opportunities 
that are accessible to workers no matter the skill or income level. 
In short, from a regional economic development standpoint, in ad-
dition to attracting and retaining knowledge workers, strategies to 
enable and encourage workers of all skill levels to pursue additional 
education and training will contribute to greater output per worker 
and ultimately regional economic growth.
For increasingly mobile knowledge workers, strategies particularly 
need to focus on attraction and retention, which means creating 
and tying them to knowledge jobs (as discussed in Misconception 
#2, above). Access to high-skilled jobs, particularly in cutting-edge 
technology sectors or knowledge-intensive industries like finance, 
insurance, business services and real estate,237 is even more influ-
ential in the location decisions of the young and single cohort of 
college graduates.238 Therefore, regional economies must actively 
identify and enhance high-growth concentrations of knowledge 
industries, occupations and functions, a strategy discussed in more 
detail in Chapter IV, “Enhance Performance of Existing and Emerg-
ing Clusters.” Aspects of innovation and governance, particularly 
the institutional and business climate, (see Chapters III and VII), 
similarly address creation of the right jobs to attract and retain high-
skilled workers. A much closer local integration of human capital 
and cluster strategies would make both more effective: emerging 
clusters often focus on common human capital needs, creating the 
opportunity to better target human capital production, retention 
and attraction around particular emerging job opportunities. Finally, 
with respect to attraction and retention, amenities may also play 
a supplementary role in human capital strategies, particularly if a 
regional economy already has the high-skilled jobs available that 
predominantly influence location decisions.239 
Labor Market Efficiency 
Effectively deploying human capital into jobs is a function of labor 
markets.  Focusing on labor markets highlights two challenges: (1) 
transaction costs which may result in under-deployment of certain 
segments of human capital; and (2) poor information “signaling” of 
current and emerging job demand, resulting in inefficient production 
(e.g., training for the wrong jobs) and matching. These two challeng-
es are related, particularly in their solution: better tying production 
and demand both reduces transaction costs and improves signaling.
An efficient labor market enables firms and workers to easily find 
and evaluate each other to form mutually productive matches. A 
critical component of firms’ transaction costs is finding and identify-
ing workers with the “right” skills to productively contribute to firm 
output, while workers’ transaction costs are driven by the search 
for jobs that leverage their skills and the need to effectively signal 
relevant skills to employers.240 Transaction costs are becoming 
more important in an increasingly knowledge-based and globalized 
economy, where the complexity and frequency of labor market trans-
actions have increased.241 
Historically, many firms recruited workers for entry-level jobs and 
invested in internal training programs that formed career ladders 
leading to advancement.242 However, the increased mobility of 
human capital in recent years has led employers to under-invest in 
training,243 placing the onus to develop industry-specific skills and 
effectively signal these skills to employers — especially for low- and 
middle-skill workers244  — increasingly on the individual. At the same 
time, the rapid pace of change in industry and technological skill 
requirements makes this more difficult — as more sophisticated 
understanding of industry trends and dynamics is needed to guide 
effective skill development, and the complexity of skill sets that 
need to be matched to jobs and signaled to employers increases.245 
As a result, there is an important role for third-party training 
programs — sometimes referred to as “labor market intermediar-
ies” (“LMIs”) to help workers and firms navigate the labor market 
and manage the higher volume of transactions.246 By focusing on 
a particular industry or sector, LMIs are frequently able to achieve 
economies of scale related to information collection, acquiring an 
expertise that would be costly and difficult for individual workers 
or firms to develop on their own. As “middlemen,” LMIs look to the 
needs of both workers and employers, helping them find each other 
and form productive matches in the face of rapidly changing market 
conditions, increasingly complex skill sets, and imperfect informa-
tion. In the case of workers, LMIs might advise on types of jobs 
available, the skill sets necessary for specific jobs, how to acquire 
those skills (if necessary) and signal them to employers. For firms, 
LMIs may reduce costs in human resource departments and shorten 
the employee search and hiring process by presenting a pool of 
qualified candidates. In sum, labor market intermediaries can help 
minimize the transaction costs to both firms and workers of forming 
productive matches.
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For segments of the labor force where transaction costs are espe-
cially high, LMIs are particularly important in promoting an ef-
ficient labor market. Employers necessarily often rely heavily on 
formal degrees and personal networks to find and assess potential 
employees. This tendency is partly due to a lack of standardized and 
reliable measurement tools for many industry-specific and “non-cog-
nitive” skills, but also decreases the transaction costs associated 
with lengthy searches. As a result, if otherwise qualified workers do 
not acquire their knowledge and skills through formal institutions 
or are not as “plugged in” to employer personal networks, they will 
be under-deployed, creating labor market inefficiency and wasted 
economic assets.247 Successful LMIs can help substitute for poor 
social networks by vetting and training workers for a specific job or 
industry and directly presenting and “certifying” job-ready appli-
cants to employers.
The challenge of reducing assessment costs is more broadly being 
met by development and implementation of certification pro-
grams.248 Certification acts as a clear signal to employers of workers’ 
abilities, and allows job seekers to assess and signal their skills to 
firms, which is particularly important in an economy where a high 
school diploma no longer consistently signals basic literacy and nu-
meracy skills249 or “job-readiness” workplace skills.250 Programs can 
address either these foundational skills or those required for spe-
cific industries or occupations.251 To the extent that industry-specific 
skills standards are aligned with foundational basic skills standards, 
clear linkages can be formed between remedial, academic and oc-
cupational programs, providing a pipeline of qualified workers to 
participating industries.
To the extent that certification is available for specific jobs or indus-
tries, it has been shown to improve labor market outcomes, particu-
larly for those lacking a four-year college degree. Among students 
that do not attend four-year colleges, workers that receive industry 
certification earn significantly higher subsequent wages than peers 
with general associate’s degrees or those who took courses in the 
humanities, especially if certified in high-growth industries.252 Mak-
ing students and incumbent workers aware of the financial benefits 
of attaining qualifications can improve both individual outcomes in 
the form of increased wages, and regional outcomes in the form of 
improved labor productivity and decreased jobs-skills gaps.  
 
A related, broader challenge underlying the efforts of all stake-
holders interested in decreasing the transaction costs of matching 
is access to and the ability to analyze accurate and timely labor 
market information to assess imbalances in regional labor supply 
and demand.  Efforts both to increase the demand-driven nature of 
human capital production and to improve labor market efficiency 
require such information. Specific demand-driven training programs 
can overcome this information challenge by directly consulting with 
local employers or industry associations about the skills needed 
for specific positions. At a regional level, however, a lack of data on 
both human capital levels and the skills demanded by employers 
makes it difficult for practitioners and researchers to diagnose larger 
trends in jobs-skills gaps. This limitation makes it more difficult to 
effectively tailor training for particular population segments and 
jobs, contributing to serious mismatches between the distribution of 
jobs and the skill qualifications of the regional workforce.253 Timely 
and detailed data on local skills and job requirements is especially 




Recent political and policy discussions have suggested that “oppor-
tunity-rich” economies, which support strong middle-class earnings 
and opportunities for upward mobility in the labor market, will be 
the ones that grow and prosper the most in the post-recession U.S. 
economy.254 While still a new topic that has yet to be fully explored, 
there are several lines of economic and political reasoning that 
underscore the importance of promoting these characteristics in 
regional economies.
At the most basic level, a labor market that allows for meritocratic 
economic mobility — either upward or downward — will best match 
workers to jobs that fully leverage their skills, helping to maximize 
labor productivity.255 Barriers to mobility, on the other hand, may 
result in wasted economic assets by underutilizing human capital.256 
Opportunities for professional and economic advancement also help 
alleviate high concentrations of poverty, which research indicates 
negatively impacts long-term regional economic outcomes.257 In 
addition to these direct economic implications, mobility also plays 
a critical role in helping create and foster a strong middle class.258 A 
vibrant middle class positively impacts long-term regional economic 
growth,259 including as an important driver of consumption for ser-
vices and products.260 
One way to increase upward mobility for workers is through “career 
pathway” programs that provide incumbent workers and job seekers 
with the necessary training and credentials to secure higher-skilled 
and better-paying jobs in regional industries or occupational clus-
ters.261 “Career pathways” align existing resources across education, 
workforce development and social service sectors —  adding new 
services where gaps may surface — to form a clearly defined series 
of steps for workers to advance from basic or remedial education to 
entry-level positions and beyond. Education and training require-
ments are coordinated with industry standards, including any neces-
sary certification, credentials or licensing, so that each step leads 
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to successively higher levels of employment in the targeted sector. 
A few innovative “career pathway” programs even integrate course 
work leading to academic credit and industry-recognized creden-
tials directly into the work setting,262 through partnerships between 
employers, education and training institutions. By providing workers 
with detailed information on how to attain the skills necessary for 
higher-paying jobs, while simultaneously offering financial and 
other supports during participation,263 “career pathways” enable 
workers to gradually advance in the labor market over time.
The notion that becoming “opportunity-rich” is important to eco-
nomic growth deserves attention, but a great deal more work is 
necessary to understand how to get there, and perhaps even what 
it precisely means. It seems an area in which practitioners are often 
ahead of policy and research, and that offers key opportunities for 
further research and product development, and ultimately for new 
strategies to strengthen regional economies.
In sum, efficiently and productively deployed human capital is the 
key driver of growth in the knowledge economy, and depends at 
least as much on having the right job pools and an efficient labor 
market as on simply producing human capital. As a result, several 
of the other leverage points (clusters, innovation, etc.) are critical 
to the productive deployment of human capital into appropriately 
matched employment opportunities, and play an important role in 
its long-term contribution to economic growth.
B. Impacts of GO TO 2040 Recommendations
 
The Chicago region is home to rich, knowledge economy job pools, 
with strengths in management, business and financial services, 
computer and mathematical occupations and the legal field, among 
others.264 The region’s workforce also exhibits high levels of educa-
tional attainment, surpassing the national average and ranking in 
the top quartile of the 100 largest U.S. metropolitan areas on both 
four-year degree-holders (33.0%) and advanced degree-holders 
(12.5%).265   
While the region has strong knowledge economy jobs and a high 
human capital workforce, there is room to continually improve 
production, attraction and retention of the “right” human capital to 
match current and future job opportunities. Access to early child-
hood education is uneven, as evidenced by the fact that only 44% of 
three and four-year old children from families earning less than half 
of the state median income were enrolled in preschool, compared to 
66% of those from families earning over 125% of the state median 
income.  Attainment of secondary education credentials is also sub-
par: across the seven-county area, an average of 11.85% of adults 
aged 18-64 do not have a high school diploma or GED (with a high of 
17% in Cook County), and the average 2007 high school graduation 
rate was only 85.7% (with a low of 78% in Cook County).266 These 
statistics reflect an unfortunate trend of an increasing jobs-skills 
mismatch in Illinois. While 52% of all Illinois’ jobs are middle-skill, 
meaning that they require a high school diploma and some post-
secondary training, in 2008 there was a 9% shortfall in workers with 
the training necessary to fill them.267 
 
Production, Attraction and Retention 
In general, the policies in GO TO 2040 are appropriately focused to 
improve the development and deployment of human capital in the 
region.268 Ensuring more equitable access to the Illinois Preschool 
for All program and improving the quality of the P-12 education 
system will help increase foundational educational attainment.269 
Additionally, encouraging partnerships between higher education 
institutions and employers will help align the knowledge and skills 
of the workforce with the needs of local employers (producing more 
of the “right” human capital), especially those experiencing worker 
shortages,270 and will make more individuals “employment-ready,”271 
increasing the quality of the region’s human capital and facilitating 
deployment of these previously underutilized human assets into 
productive economic activity.
Increasing both average educational levels and the region’s pro-
portion of college graduates (particularly among minority popula-
tions)272 will have a positive impact on regional productivity, wages 
and employment growth, to the extent that the human capital is 
deployed in jobs that effectively leverage workers’ skills and experi-
ence.  Human capital production strategies should be closely coordi-
nated with cluster-based job creation strategies (discussed further 
below) to ensure that the benefits of tailored training programs are 
fully realized. Research indicates that a one-year increase in the av-
erage educational attainment of individual workers in a metropolitan 
area increases total factor productivity by about 3%,273 productivity 
in manufacturing jobs by 8.5%, and productivity in non-manufactur-
ing jobs by 12.5%.274 
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As a reflection of this enhanced productivity, wage levels increase.  
One of the first economists to formally study the relationship 
between human capital and wages, Jacob Mincer calculated that 
workers’ individual annual earnings rose by 7% across the 1950s 
and 1960s for every year of additional schooling.275 More recently, 
Hungerford and Wassmer report that, as of 2001, high school gradu-
ates earn about 6% more than those without a high school diploma, 
and college graduates earn 65% more than high school graduates.276 
In addition, knowledge spillover effects from a one-percentage-point 
increase in a city’s overall portion of college-educated residents 
results in a 0.6% to 1.2% increase in average worker wages.277   
In addition to addressing the production of human capital, GO TO 
2040 also addresses quality-of-life factors and efforts to pro-
mote “livable” communities, which will help attract and retain 
high-skilled workers on the margins.278 However, as previously 
mentioned, the plan does not sufficiently focus on job creation 
(necessary for retention and attraction). The plan’s preliminary work 
and recommendations on clusters, and its innovation recommenda-
tions,279 take key steps in this direction, but implementation in the 
area of improving deployment of human capital will require consid-
erable additional focus on strategies for creating the rich job pools 
that are critical to attracting, retaining and productively deploying 
human capital, as well as on the structure and efficiency of the labor 
market.
 
Labor Market Efficiency 
GO TO 2040’s recommendations also address the issue of improved 
labor market efficiency.  Recommending that higher education 
institutions strengthen partnerships with employers provides an ap-
propriate emphasis on the importance of employer-driven education 
and workforce development programs.  These could result in more 
strategic production of the “right” human capital, as well as bet-
ter prospects for productive deployment in local jobs, thus aiding 
efforts to retain skilled workers.  This recommendation will enable 
higher education institutions to better identify the knowledge and 
skills required for employment, align curricula with those goals, 
provide students with skills demanded by private industry and lever-
age relationships with specific industries to increase internships, 
summer employment and work-study opportunities.  One effect of 
doing so will be to lower firms’ assessment costs, as students will 
have completed curricula they co-designed, and firms can easily 
recognize their relevant skills.  Moving forward, labor market inter-
mediaries (LMIs) like those described above or other types of public-
private collaborations (i.e., beyond employer-higher education 
partnerships) should be created and strengthened as well, including 
to expand the range of skills for which employer-driven training and 
certification is available (e.g., for individuals involved in energy and 
water efficiency retrofits, as described in the “Livable Communities” 
implementation action areas of GO TO 2040).  These could include 
expanding and improving formal partnerships between private-sec-
tor employers and workforce development, economic development 
and human service agencies.
In addition to formal partnerships with the private sector, GO TO 
2040’s recommendation to collect and analyze better data about 
labor market and industry trends to guide decision making in the ed-
ucation and workforce development sectors will help align services 
with employer needs, and could further reduce employer and worker 
transaction costs, critically improving labor market efficiencies.  
These efforts will help facilitate productive firm-worker matches, 
lowering the transaction costs associated with sorting for both firms 
and workers, and help retain high-skilled workers by providing op-
portunities for them to effectively deploy their human capital in the 
regional economy. Moving forward, particularly as better informa-
tion is developed, it should be possible to further strengthen and fo-
cus employer-driven training programs, and to support development 




GO TO 2040’s recommendation to develop “career pathways” in col-
laboration with industry and occupational representatives will make 
the region’s economy more “opportunity-rich” as opportunities 
for mobility are clarified and relevant information is disseminated.  
Synthesizing existing local and state-wide work, improving existing 
pathways and articulating pathways for new industries and occu-
pations will provide the region’s workforce with opportunities for 
ongoing upward mobility and the regional economy with continually 
increasing levels of productivity.  
In aggregate, GO TO 2040’s policy recommendations related to hu-
man capital development and deployment address one of the most 
important factors in regional economic growth, and will increase 
productivity of workers and firms, enhancing attraction and reten-
tion of both.
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A. Definition and Significance
 
One of the most complex challenges in driving regional economic 
growth is determining how government can enable and improve the 
performance of the private sector — where wealth is overwhelming 
created — without displacing or unnecessarily distorting it. Neo-
classical economic theory is often used as the rationale for limiting 
government action to specification of property rights, as further 
actions are claimed to obstruct efficient market operations. How-
ever, if, as North and others believe, effective institutions can play a 
central role in facilitating economic progress, there is a strong case 
to be made for improving government (and other institutions) as a 
strategy for pursuing economic growth.280 
Through taxes, regulation and provision of public goods (from 
education to infrastructure), government enables, shapes and 
uses markets.281 Government has a very significant — but carefully 
strategic — role to play both in increasing inputs to the economy 
(e.g., education increasing human capital) as well as in enhancing 
its efficiency and productivity (e.g., by providing infrastructure and 
addressing market imperfections). Playing these roles well entails 
strategically targeting government activities to the other economic 
leverage points, as well as improving the efficiency and productivity 
of government itself.
The range of ways in which government can affect the regional 
economy is many and varied. The review that follows is limited to 
addressing three important aspects of government influence on the 






Among the defining characteristics of America’s metropolitan 
regions is the presence of many units of government — indeed, 
since 1960, the United States has been creating new governmental 
entities — general purpose governments, school districts, busi-
ness improvement districts, park districts, etc. — at the rate of 
approximately one every 18 days. The country now has over 90,000 
distinct governmental entities, the vast majority of them with both 
administrative powers and taxing authority.282 The geography of 
economic activity, however, does not conform to the boundaries of 
these varied governmental units. Rather, the systems that consti-
tute the regional economy — including housing and labor markets, 
transportation infrastructure, and others — operate across jurisdic-
tional boundaries.  System characteristics in one place (neighbor-
hood, municipality, county, etc.) affect performance throughout 
the entire region, contributing to or detracting from firms’ ability 
to operate efficiently and productively. The result of a fragmented 
government environment is inefficient allocation of resources and 
increased (time and financial) costs of doing business. Furthermore, 
the mismatch between the political boundaries of local governments 
and the (often regional) geography of economic activities results in 
duplication of services, missed economies of scale, collective action 
problems, difficulty addressing negative externalities (such as pollu-
tion or congestion) and increased concentration of poverty.  
Local governments in U.S. metropolitan areas come in two basic 
types, and the proliferation of either kind poses challenges as 
metropolitan areas become overly fragmented. General-purpose 
governments (such as municipal or county governments) provide a 
wide array of services. Horizontal fragmentation describes the pres-
ence of multiple non-overlapping governments within a region — 
consider, for example, how many distinct contiguous municipalities 
comprise any one of America’s metropolitan regions. Special-pur-
pose jurisdictions, by contrast, are created to provide a particular 
service (e.g., school districts, library districts, water and sewerage 
districts, fire districts). Vertical fragmentation describes the layering 
of multiple units of government on top of each other, all serving the 
same geographic area (or multiple, overlapping areas) — consider, 
for example, instances in which residents are served by, pay taxes to 
and vote for leaders of not only their municipal government but also 
the school district, mass transit district, community college dis-
trict, water reclamation district, forest preserve district and others. 
These two kinds of government fragmentation each pose their own 
challenges to the regional economy, and provide their own oppor-
tunities for government coordination to enhance regional economic 
growth.283 
There are two schools of thought regarding the impact of horizontal 
fragmentation on the efficacy and efficiency of government service 
provision: one contends that a horizontal proliferation of govern-
ments creates competitive intergovernmental forces that lead to effi-
cient provision of public goods and services, while a second argues 
that the presence of externalities causes a horizontally fragmented 
government environment to be inefficient.
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The first of these viewpoints, inaugurated in 1956 by economist and 
geographer Charles Tiebout,284 argues that governments and citi-
zens are analogous to firms and consumers in a competitive market. 
Just as in a perfect (theoretical) market competition between firms 
to sell their products to consumers leads to the optimal allocation 
of resources in the production of private market goods, the com-
petition between communities for residents is believed to lead to 
the optimal allocation of resources in the provision of public-sector 
services.285 On the demand side, residents (viewed as consumers 
of public services) reveal their preferences through their decisions 
on where to live.286 On the production side, leaders of local govern-
ments are motivated to provide services more cost effectively by 
their job-retention motive (just as the leaders of firms are motivated 
to produce more cost effectively by their profit motive).287 This model 
implies that horizontal fragmentation of local governments will 
result in highly efficient government service provision because the 
presence of multiple communities from which to choose creates a 
competition among governments for residents; allows residents to 
find a community closely matching their preference set; and reduces 
the costs of moving between communities.288 
Tiebout’s model has been highly influential, serving as the point of 
departure for over 1,000 books and articles in economics and politi-
cal science, and providing the foundation for much of the literature 
on local public finance.289 Tiebout himself, however, recognized limi-
tations to his model that have important implications for its practi-
cal application. In particular, his model assumes that the market 
in which communities compete for residents is characterized by an 
absence of externalities — positive or negative impacts on neighbor-
ing communities — whereas in reality “there are obvious external 
economies and diseconomies between communities… in cases in 
which the external economies and diseconomies are of sufficient 
importance, some form of integration may be indicated.”290 As the 
discussion below reveals, while there are many benefits to inter-
governmental competition, there are also substantial costs, which 
at a minimum suggest the benefits of much greater coordination 
between local governmental units (and in many instances suggest 
consolidation).
 
The literature which casts doubt on the applicability of Tiebout’s 
model focuses on the externalities that arise in the context of 
intergovernmental competition. Wallace Oates’ seminal study on the 
implications of local governments’ competition to attract business 
investment expresses a concern that competition between govern-
ments can lead to inefficiently low tax rates and an under-provision 
of local services.291 Many subsequent studies have confirmed his 
suspicions, identifying instances in which welfare for a single 
jurisdiction may be optimized while overall regional welfare is 
reduced (as further detailed in the next section on tax policies).292 
In these models, an increase in one jurisdiction’s tax rate benefits 
its neighbors by making their jurisdictions’ comparatively lower tax 
rates more attractive to businesses seeking to locate in the region.  
Because the higher-tax-rate government would not benefit from this 
decision to increase rates, it will likely allow its rates of taxation and 
its corresponding level of public service provision to remain lower 
than is optimal.293 The problem is compounded by the concern that 
“when all governments behave this way, none gain a competitive ad-
vantage, and consequently, communities are all worse off than they 
would have been”294 if competition for capital had not influenced 
their decision making. This literature supports a role for coordina-
tion between local governments in a region in order to overcome the 
detrimental impacts of the intergovernmental competition resulting 
from horizontal fragmentation.
An example of this problem (which is one of CMAP’s taxation policy 
concerns) is what recent literature calls the “fiscalization of land 
use.”295 It appears that as local governments receive much-needed 
revenues from retail sales taxes (particularly where they face con-
straints on raising revenue from other tax sources, particularly prop-
erty taxes), it may cause them through zoning, subsidies and other 
interventions to compete with each other for retail development at 
the expense of other commercial and industrial development. The 
argued effect, at a minimum, is that this results in a spatially inef-
ficient distribution of retail across the region. 
More generally, other studies have questioned the very premise of 
the Tiebout model. They argue that treating competition between 
governments like competition between firms in a functioning market 
is erroneous, concluding that intergovernmental competition is 
destructive of the capacity of governments to provide the very goods 
and services to which they are best suited. That is, if governments 
are stepping in where markets fail, introducing competition between 
governments will simply re-create the kind of market failure govern-
ment initially intervened to address.296 Coordination across jurisdic-
tions is essential to ensuring governments’ ability to effectively and 
efficiently provide the services to which they are uniquely suited, 
and which are essential to a well-functioning regional economy.
Furthermore, there are many simpler and more obvious examples 
of the need for and benefits of local inter-governmental coordina-
tion or of consolidating governmental units. Consider, for example, 
two small neighboring suburbs which each support their own fire 
departments, though large economies of scale would be created by 
having one fire department serve both suburbs. Also, many sys-
tems — such as highways or public transit — operate across local 
governmental boundaries in ways which mean that they cannot be 
efficiently developed and maintained by local governments.
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The vertical fragmentation of government in the U.S. — through pro-
liferation of special-purpose districts — is a more recently observed 
phenomenon than horizontal fragmentation, and one which has con-
sequently received far less attention in academic literature. Growth 
in special-purpose units of government has been so prolific over the 
past 50 years that there are now more special-purpose governments 
than municipal governments, and special-purpose governments, in 
aggregate, not only spend more combined than all cities in the U.S., 
but employ more civilian staff than the federal government.297 This 
vertical fragmentation leads to severe challenges to the efficient 
provision of public services.
There are two key characteristics of overlapping special-purpose 
jurisdictions which lead to an inefficient level of public service deliv-
ery. The first is concurrent taxation: multiple independent govern-
ment units draw on the same tax base to fund their services. The 
second is selective participation: when governments are dedicated 
to providing only one service, voters who care more about that 
service are more likely to participate in elections for the govern-
ment’s leadership than voters who are relatively indifferent.298   
Politicians seeking reelection are therefore guided solely by the 
preferences of the citizens who vote in their elections. The combina-
tion of these two characteristics creates what can be described as a 
fiscal common pool problem, analogous to common pool problems 
in resource economics.299 Special-purpose governments are able to 
provide the services valued by their respective interest groups with 
funding from the tax base at large, creating vertical externalities 
which distort public service provision. While these governments 
receive taxes from the general citizenry (who are thus paying for 
services they do not particularly value), they provide benefits tar-
geted to their narrower constituency (who are thus getting services 
for which they only pay a fraction of the costs). The more layers of 
governments that are created, the more acute the “overfishing” of 
the common tax base becomes. In this context, special-purpose 
jurisdictions will tax and spend more than general-purpose govern-
ments when tasked with providing the same service. There is little 
to no evidence, furthermore, that special-purpose jurisdictions 
provide higher quality services than general-purpose governments 
do.300 Regional coordination and consolidation could help alleviate 
the fiscal common pool problem created by the vertical layering of 
single-purpose jurisdictions.
Finally, both horizontal and vertical fragmentation impose admin-
istrative burdens on businesses, that add to their costs of produc-
tion. Each governing body enacts an additional layer of regulatory 
requirements to which businesses must adhere, often requiring 
a separate set of procedures and approvals for processes such as 
business licensing or construction permitting. This adds to the time 
required to execute day-to-day business activities and contributes to 
the firms’ costs of doing business, negatively affecting their overall 
performance.
Balanced Tax Policy 
Tax policy plays a role in firms’ location decisions, as well as their 
ability to grow and prosper in their chosen locations. Taxes are a 
cost of production, levied on inputs to production (land, labor, ma-
terials, etc.) and often on firms’ income, all of which directly affect 
firm profitability. As such, tax policy is often viewed as a key lever 
for influencing economic growth, particularly through firm attraction 
and retention.
There is a vast and continually evolving literature on the impact of 
taxation on business location decision and economic growth at the 
local, regional and state level. It has become the prevalent belief in 
some circles that there is a clear-cut negative relationship between 
taxation and economic growth: a lower tax burden will increase 
growth, while a higher tax burden will hinder it.301 Indeed, microeco-
nomic theory holds that to the extent that taxation creates a dead-
weight loss302 in transactions in competitive markets, any increase 
in taxes will increase said loss, and all else being equal, will impede 
economic growth. A large segment of the literature, furthermore, 
has found a statistically meaningful negative correlation between 
local tax burdens and economic growth when comparing regions’ 
performance to one another (i.e., inter-regional tax differentials 
and growth patterns).303 In two influential pieces of work during the 
early 1990s,304 Timothy Bartik, for example, finds that among the 57 
studies he reviewed, 40 find a statistically significant negative rela-
tionship between tax level and business activity.305 Further studies 
in the years immediately following Bartik’s review revealed similar 
conclusions.306 
However, drawing policy conclusions from the results of these 
studies is not straightforward, as they do not address the positive 
role that public goods, funded by tax revenue, play in encouraging 
economic growth. A few studies have begun to explore the impacts 
of taxation in a more nuanced way, providing evidence that simply 
lowering taxes, without consideration of the corresponding effect on 
public service provision, is at least too simple an economic growth 
strategy — and more likely, wrong — particularly if the goal is to cul-
tivate a high-performing knowledge-based economy. For example, 
both Bartik’s original review and its subsequent update by Wasyl-
enko sound cautionary notes regarding the implications of the lit-
erature’s findings for policy implementation. While concluding that 
lowering state and local taxes can significantly increase business 
activity,307 Bartik also acknowledges the limitations of his findings: 
if tax cuts are paid for by cutting public services important to the 
region’s economy, the net impact could be a reduction in economic 
activity. Wasylenko also raises the issue of flaws in the research 
design, questioning the extent to which measures of wages, taxes 
and other factors accurately reflect economic reality.308 Thus while 
the tax-effect literature does show a negative relationship between 
some measure of the tax level and economic activity across regions, 
the models’ measurement issues and exclusion of the benefits 
businesses receive through the deployment of tax dollars into public 
goods urges caution in interpreting these results to mean that low-
ering taxes is an effective tool for spurring economic growth.
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Further, as a cost of production, taxes generally represent only 
a small portion of the costs that businesses incur in the normal 
course of operations. Therefore, the composite tax burden (prop-
erty, income/revenue and sales combined) is not the primary factor 
on which business base their location and expansion decisions,309   
particularly when making an inter-regional decision (i.e., among 
several potential regions).310 Furthermore, the relative significance 
of the tax burden as a location decision factor varies by industry, 
playing a larger role for manufacturing and wholesale firms (which 
are  capital-and land-intensive) as well as retail establishments 
(whose business is itself the sale of taxable goods), than for head-
quarters, corporate offices, research and development facilities and 
service-based establishments.311 This suggests that using tax levels 
as a lever for influencing firms’ inter-regional location decisions, 
and consequently economic growth, is unlikely to yield substantial 
results, particularly if the economic goal is to develop strong knowl-
edge-based sectors and functional concentrations (as discussed in 
Chapter IV).
The tax-effect literature exhibits less extensive coverage of the 
impact taxation may have on differences in economic growth within 
regions — i.e., between municipalities within the same region — yet 
it still offers important insights. The general consensus is that tax 
effects are larger within regions than they are between regions312  
— perhaps four times as large313 and possibly more significant for 
industrial activity as it relates to property tax burden in particular.314   
These findings — that tax effects are of a greater magnitude intra-
regionally — are somewhat intuitive, given that many of the non-tax 
factors influencing business selection of a region (e.g., quality of 
labor force or infrastructure) are available to the business wherever 
it locates within the selected region, while once it has selected a 
region, it can pick a local jurisdiction based on tax factors.  
From the perspective of metropolitan policy, intra-regional tax ef-
fects emphasize the importance of coordinating among the juris-
dictions within a region, as discussed in the prior section. If one 
jurisdiction within a region is able to gain comparative advantage 
by lowering its tax rates (or offering tax incentives), its neighbors 
are likely to follow suit, establishing a dynamic of local competition 
and eliminating the advantage for any.315 That is, what accrues to the 
short-term benefit of a single jurisdiction can cause long-term harm 
to the region as a whole.
 
More importantly, overall, researchers on tax effects have come 
to realize that from a policy perspective, taxes are not raised or 
lowered in a vacuum. There is a meaningful relationship between 
government tax revenues and public service provision, and the 
quality of public services impacts regional economic growth.316 
Businesses benefit from the public goods that are funded with local 
tax revenue — what can be called “productivity amenities”317 — both 
through direct impact on business operations and indirectly through 
other amenities (including ones that help attract necessary human 
capital). Empirical studies suggest that the most valuable of these 
include transportation infrastructure, public education and public 
safety.318 “High-road regions” invest in these types of productivity-
enhancing public goods to add value to the private sector and re-
duce waste, responding to firms’ profit motivation and enabling at-
traction and retention of high-quality firms.319 Investing tax revenues 
in the types of public goods that make businesses most productive 
will achieve a high net return for tax dollars “invested” and contrib-
ute positively to both business performance and the regions’ ability 
to attract and retain firms and workers. 
The question of taxation from the perspective of regional policy 
becomes not whether tax cuts will stimulate economic growth (and if 
so, how much), but rather how valued governmental services, if tax 
cuts are implemented, will be funded, or if taxes are raised, how to 
spend the additional revenue most effectively. Several studies have 
even found that increasing taxes to fund improved public services 
has positive net impact on regional economic activity,320 suggesting 
that a strategy of raising taxes in order to improve service quality, 
particularly in areas especially important to the regional economy, 
could be more effective at influencing economic growth than cutting 
taxes at the expense of investment in these services.
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Access to High-Quality Information 
Among the assumptions underlying neoclassical economics models 
of perfectly competitive markets is the presence of perfect informa-
tion among market participants: each knows everything there is to 
know; none knows any more than any other; and actions by market 
participants do not destabilize this state of perfection. Although 
economists have long recognized the disconnect between real-life 
markets and this assumption, it has only been in the last forty years 
that a rich literature has developed to investigate the impact of in-
formation imperfections on market performance. The key insights of 
this literature are twofold: first, market failure resulting from imper-
fect information is pervasive; second, these market failures reveal 
roles that government can play in enhancing economic efficiency.
The role and impact of information imperfections may be most 
evident in the exchange function of markets: the coming together of 
buyers and sellers to execute a transaction. Essentially, the quality 
of information affects the cost of any transaction — the finding and 
measurement costs for buyers and sellers to locate each other and 
evaluate risk. Poor information, for example, makes it more expen-
sive for banks to serve consumers without a credit history, or for real 
estate developers or retailers to find and evaluate opportunities in 
less developed urban areas.321 Information imperfections also cause 
several kinds of more complex market failures.
Incomplete information (each participant does not know all there is 
to know) can impact the exchange function by allowing the price of 
goods to rise above the level implied by efficient market behavior.  
In real-world markets, no single actor knows everything there is 
to know about the goods being traded in the market,322 and prices 
often vary greatly across sellers of the same good. Buyers therefore 
incur costs to identify the seller with the lowest price. These search 
costs are not the same for all buyers,323 meaning that markets will 
tend to settle at an equilibrium price far above what a competi-
tive market would imply, as buyers with high search costs remain 
relatively uninformed and buy goods at higher prices, preventing 
informed buyers (those with low search costs) from driving down 
prices to competitive equilibrium. Government intervention to re-
duce search costs can lead to improved efficiency outcomes.324   
Asymmetric information — the condition of various market partici-
pants not possessing information of equal quality — also leads to 
market inefficiencies.325 When sellers have better information about 
the quality of a good than buyers, buyers are compelled to use rule-
of-thumb measures to evaluate the quality of a good, causing them 
to discount their offering prices, often below what a seller is willing 
to accept for a high-quality good. The result is a lower quality of 
goods offered for sale; a smaller marketplace; or even the elimina-
tion of the functioning market entirely. “Adverse selection” — lower-
quality goods driving higher-quality goods out of the market — can, 
under some conditions, lead to total market failure, whereby no 
transactions will take place at any price.326 Government intervention 
to improve the balance of information between buyers and sellers 
can help avoid the phenomenon of adverse selection.
 
While these examples of the impact imperfect information has on 
economic efficiency are drawn from its role in the exchange func-
tion of markets, information also plays a role in the production and 
consumption functions of markets. In production, better information 
can improve firm productivity in a variety of ways — for example, 
by reducing waste in production processes, or by allowing a firm to 
better track its inventory. In consumption, better information can in-
fluence consumer preferences and shift demand. For example, more 
and better information about the health effects of various foods has 
caused consumers to make more of their product choices based on 
the reported nutritional values. In response, food producers have 
developed healthier products and are marketing them based on 
their nutritional characteristics. While it is in the exchange function 
that the effects of imperfect information are most evident, govern-
ments attempting to use information to drive economic growth 
should attend to production and consumption functions as well.327 
There are many ways in which governments can address the inef-
ficiencies created by imperfect information, and improve economic 
performance by improving the availability and quality of information 
for market participants. Government through its other functions is 
a primary gatherer and repository of the types of information that 
can help reduce transaction costs and otherwise improve market 
efficiency. Data on household income, assets and expenditures; 
on real estate parcels and status; on retail performance in varied 
geographies; on labor market characteristics; and much, much more 
is routinely gathered by government, and can be readily made avail-
able. A great deal of progress has been made in the last decade on 
this relatively inexpensive and high-impact role for government.328 
Better information resources also play a key role in increasing the 
efficiency of government itself, for planning, implementing and 
monitoring its activities. Greater transparency in government data 
(i.e., releasing more information) and more widespread public ac-
cess to information (including in electronic form) both empowers 
citizens to make better decisions and drives greater government 
accountability. Increased government information efficiency also re-
duces the transaction costs of businesses with government, as well 
as lowering the costs (and so tax burden) of government.
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B. Impacts of GO TO 2040 Recommendations
 
Applying this understanding of the economics of government coordi-
nation, taxation and information to the effects that GO TO 2040 will 
have on the local government landscape (Chapter I, Characteristic 
4), it is evident that the recommendations in GO TO 2040 will im-
prove government’s support of private-sector growth. Implementing 
these recommendations will contribute to the attraction, retention 




The seven-county Chicago region is home to 1,226 governmental 
units — more than any other region in the country.329 The Chicago 
region has more general-purpose governments (counties, townships 
and municipalities) relative to its population than two thirds of the 
nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas (ranked 67th), and ranks 
nearly the same when examining the number of special-purpose 
governments relative to population (ranked 63rd).330 
The GO TO 2040 recommendations related to increasing the coor-
dination of inter-governmental activities will reduce the negative 
impacts of the region’s extensive horizontal and vertical government 
fragmentation. The process of developing the GO TO 2040 plan 
itself is an important first step in building regional consensus and 
cooperation, and subsequent approval and adoption of the plan by 
representatives of the region’s large and diverse pool of constitu-
ent communities will further enhance coordination as it moves the 
plan another step closer to full implementation. Increased inter-
jurisdictional coordination will improve regional efficiency by taking 
advantage of economies of scale in service provision (and reducing 
duplication) and reducing the negative externalities that accompany 
intra-regional competition for funding and investment activity. Fur-
ther, the plan’s recommendations that state and federal programs 
be more integrated (e.g., combining environment, transportation, 
housing, education) and that more federal funding streams be 
targeted to metro areas will further support efforts to focus and co-
ordinate government activities within the region. Better aligning the 
decision-making processes of the region’s many and varied govern-
mental units will increase the productivity and efficiency with which 
businesses can operate, contributing to regional economic growth.
Moving forward, GO TO 2040’s coordination recommendations 
could be enhanced by focusing on opportunities for coordination on 
issues other than funding and investment. Further emphasis could 
be placed on the advantages of inter-jurisdictional cooperation on 
tax policy and regulations that directly affect the profitability of the 
region’s businesses, which would also reduce local governments’ 
incentives to compete for business investment. Additional attention 
could also be given to the ways in which coordinated policy and 
service delivery can address collective action problems, negative 
externalities (such as pollution or congestion) and increased con-
centration of poverty. Going further, considering the sheer number 
of governmental units, much more detailed analysis and political 
organizing should be undertaken to move beyond coordination to 
consolidation or elimination.  
 
Tax Policy 
The region’s multi-faceted tax system — including income, property 
and sales taxes — is highly complex. There are concerns that the 
region’s tax burden may compromise competition with other regions 
for businesses and residents,331 and the processes for levying and 
distributing revenue may also pose challenges for business efficien-
cy and productivity, and consequently regional economic growth.332 
The recommendations in GO TO 2040 will foster economic growth by 
seeking to balance the region’s tax policies with the need to provide 
the public goods most valued by businesses and households. The 
tax policy recommendations (Chapter I, Characteristic 4) seek to 
identify ways to streamline the regional tax system and provide 
a more stable long-term funding stream. Recommendations that 
encourage increased investment of tax revenue in public goods such 
as transportation (Chapter I, Characteristic 1), education (Chapter I, 
Characteristic 3) and protection and provision of open space (Chap-
ter I, Characteristic 5) are directly and well targeted to better tying 
taxes to the particular public goods that add value to businesses.  
This high value per tax dollar will support a “high road” economy 
and contribute to economic growth by aiding in productivity, attrac-
tion and retention of businesses and households.
GO TO 2040 tends to focus on taxes as a cost to households to 
a greater extent than as a cost to firms of doing business. Going 
forward, greater attention should be paid to addressing the effects 
that tax policy (including regional collaboration with respect to tax 
policies) can have on the performance of businesses.  
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Information Transparency and Sharing 
In January 2010, the State of Illinois adopted revised Freedom of 
Information Act legislation, placing heightened responsibility on 
public agencies to make their information available to the public.333 
The recommendations in GO TO 2040 will not only respond to this 
mandate by increasing the amount and quality of information avail-
able to government entities, businesses and households (Chapter 
I, Characteristics 3 and 4), but in doing so will also reduce the costs 
of economic transactions and increase the efficiency of the regional 
economy.  If more accurate market information is made available, 
businesses will face lower transaction costs when identifying 
potential new opportunities and evaluating their anticipated costs, 
benefits and risks. Data on workforce development programs and 
information regarding innovation support resources will also be use-
ful to business. Data-sharing among local governments, in particu-
lar, will produce benefits of several types. More thorough and timely 
knowledge of local conditions will enable them to be more strategic 
in their investment of time and resources for program and policy 
development, as well as better able to evaluate the results of those 
initiatives following implementation. Further, broader information 
sharing will increase transparency of government activities and 
performance, and ultimately their efficiency.
CMAP’s Regional Indicators Project and the recommendations in 
GO TO 2040 represent a critical and major step toward enhancing 
the availability of information resources for market development. 
Two key areas deserve further attention. First, the identification and 
discussion of information primarily views governments, and to some 
extent households, as the customers, using the information primar-
ily for planning and tracking activities. It is not tailored to the role 
and opportunity to provide the types of information resources that 
will lower transaction costs and expand market activity for business-
es. Similarly, the focus is primarily on raw data and simple descrip-
tive tools, without the sophisticated analytic tools that will attract 
users and enable more efficient markets. Over time, the Regional 
Indicators Project and the broader data warehouse effort should be 
expanded to include more online data and decision-making tools 
that take into account the types of data, analyses and decision tools 
that are most useful to the private sector.334 It could also involve 
using an online platform as a forum for linking local businesses and 
affiliated organizations to one another for the purpose of informa-
tion exchange and networking.335 
Second, related to the other government recommendations as  
well, as its information activities expand, CMAP should support 
local governments in moving toward increased online access and 
transactional capacity with respect to government services and 
programs.  Often referred to as “e-government” or “government 2.0” 
— including licensing and permitting, submitting service requests, 
access to social services and so on — this capacity enables the re-
gion’s businesses and residents to interact more efficiently with the  
public sector, thus lowering both their transaction costs and the 
costs of government.  
 
 
Overall, GO TO 2040’s recommendations for greater government 
coordination, more efficient and high-value-added tax policy and  
development and provision of better information resources begin 
to address critical challenges and opportunities in the regional 
economy, and will move governance, particularly as it affects eco-
nomic performance, in the right direction. The focus of the recom-
mendations on government efficiency and household cost savings 
is not matched, however, by a focus on enabling private-sector 
economic activity. Broadly, implementation would benefit from a 
more concerted focus on policies and investments that facilitate 
growth in private-sector economic activity. In addition, expanding 
the information recommendations to include “government 2.0” and 
robust analytical market tools could further enhance the impact of 
this set of recommendations. Finally, it should be acknowledged 
that the region’s local governments have a tendency to act very cau-
tiously in sharing information with one another and their respective 
constituencies. Given this legacy, CMAP faces a significant challenge 
in changing the culture of government in order to promote increased 
transparency and sharing of government information across pro-
gram silos and geographies. 
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Among the GO TO 2040 recommendations, three other types of im-
pacts of economic significance can be identified: regional resilience, 
household savings and enhanced amenities.  
A. Regional Resilience 
 
An important feature of a regional economy, and the subject of 
increasing attention and research,336 is its resilience in the face of 
challenges. Resilience is defined as the ability of a region to bounce 
back from an external stress or challenge and recover healthy 
functionality. Evidence of resilience can be found in the ability of 
regions and the organizations within them to respond to a challenge 
by redeploying assets, collaborating within and across the public, 
private and non-profit sectors and capturing resources from external 
sources.337 Resilience does not cause economic growth, in the sense 
which is the focus of the rest of this report, but it ameliorates eco-
nomic downturns and provides insurance against economic shocks, 
and so increasing resilience is valuable to the regional economy.
A growing body of research attempts to identify the characteristics 
and behaviors that make regions more resilient. For example, one 
study finds that the most resilient are typically characterized by 
industry diversity, high levels of innovation and high educational 
attainment of the workforce. It also notes that participating in the 
knowledge economy, particularly through attracting high-skilled 
workers and engaging in innovation, is strongly associated with 
resilience, in terms of maintaining high wages or reversing a 
downward trend.338 A more recent study echoes the importance of 
industry diversity, innovation and high educational attainment of 
the workforce, but also finds modern physical infrastructure, strong 
local governance and a supportive financial system to be important 
to the resilience of metropolitan areas.339 Places exhibiting a combi-
nation of these characteristics are likely to be more adaptable and 
quick to recover from economic shocks over the long term than their 
non-resilient counterparts.
The changes to the economic landscape described in Chapter I, 
and the economic analysis in the ensuing chapters, make clear that 
implementation of the GO TO 2040 recommendations will address 
these factors which substantially increase the resilience of the re-
gional economy. Increasing innovation will make the economy more 
flexible and adaptive, as will increasing human capital and improv-
ing governance. Enhancing diverse clusters will further promote a 
diverse economy, less subject to shocks in any single sector.
In addition, implementation of the recommendations will make the 
region more resilient in the face of several specific potential outside 
shocks. Four types of recommendations in GO TO 2040 will serve to 
make the region’s households and businesses less dependent on 
scarce resources that are often subject to volatility in supply and 
pricing, and will make local governments’ ability to provide key pub-
lic goods less vulnerable to the volatility of the macroeconomic busi-
ness cycle, buffering the region’s economy from potential adverse 







 (i)  Strategically Improve Transportation Infrastructure 
Decreased reliance on surface travel via private automobiles 
and freight-bearing trucks will make the region more resilient 
to potential fluctuations in the price of petroleum in the fu-
ture. Improvements to the region’s roadways, freight rail and 
public transit systems, together with recommendations that 
discourage peak-time driving (see Chapter V), will decrease 
the number of vehicle-miles traveled on the region’s road-
ways, and consequently, the amount of petroleum-based 
fuel consumed by households and businesses. Therefore, 
any future increases in the price of petroleum will have a less 
significant impact on the region than they would have in the 
absence of these recommendations.
 (ii)  Water and Energy Conservation 
Within the group of GO TO 2040 recommendations aimed at 
improving the regional quality of life (Chapter I, Character-
istic 5), the conservation and retrofitting recommendation, 
by lowering rates of energy and water consumption, will 
make the region’s economy more resilient to potential future 
shocks to the supply of those resources. Water supplies are 
most vulnerable to natural phenomena such as drought, 
while energy supplies are at risk of both weather-related 
events and broader global circumstances in trade and natural 
resource pricing that could lead to short- or long-term rises 
in energy prices. The more conservatively the region’s busi-
nesses and households use water and energy resources, the 
less severe the impact of future changes in water or energy 
pricing will be for the region’s economy.
 (iii)  Support of Local Food Systems 
GO TO 2040 recommends improving local food production 
and distribution (Chapter I, Characteristic 5). Supporting 
local food systems makes the region more resilient in four 
ways: (i) by reducing the long journeys taken by food and 
so the impact of future rises in fuel prices;340 (ii) by reducing 
exposure to significant disruptions in any one of the small 
number of firms that dominate the industrial food econo-
my;341 (iii) by increasing agrobiological diversity that makes 
crops less vulnerable to diseases; and (iv) by reducing vulner-
ability to both accidental and deliberate (e.g., bioterrorism) 
contamination through decentralization of production and 
processing.342 
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(iv)  Reform State and Local Tax Policy 
GO TO 2040’s recommendation to explore state and local tax 
policy reforms (Chapter I, Characteristic 4) suggests a goal of 
reducing local governments’ reliance on sales tax revenue. Be-
cause Illinois sales tax revenue is allocated to the jurisdiction 
in which the sale occurs, local budgets are directly linked to the 
performance of the retail sector.343 Because sales are depen-
dent on consumers’ willingness to spend, retailers are typically 
among the hardest hit during economic downturns,344 causing 
many economists to view sales tax as one of the most volatile 
revenue instruments — compared to income and property 
taxes.345 The revenue swings associated with sales tax collec-
tions are ultimately manifested in municipalities’ budgets: 
relying heavily on unstable sales tax revenue can compromise 
the ability of local governments to provide public goods such 
as infrastructure and schools and support growth-oriented 
policies such as job creation.346 Reducing local governments’ 
dependence on sales tax revenue to fund public goods and 
services will make the region’s municipalities more resilient in 
the face of future economic downturns.
B. Household Cost Savings 
 
Two types of GO TO 2040 recommendations will benefit the region’s 
residents by lowering the costs of basic household expenditures.  
These savings can be reallocated to more productive uses such as 
obtaining additional skills and education (to increase productivity 
and wages), starting a new business or other local consumption and 
investment activities that may better benefit the regional economy.
 (i)  Strategically Improve Transportation Infrastructure and 
Facilitate a More Compact Development Pattern 
Recommendations affecting the region’s transportation infra-
structure and built environment (Chapter I, Characteristics 1 
and 2) will lower transportation costs for households through 
a combination of shorter trip distances and reduced travel 
times due to lower per capita congestion. Households will 
have additional disposable income that can be reinvested 
elsewhere in the regional economy.
 (ii)  Water and Energy Conservation 
The GO TO 2040 recommendation that encourages water- 
and energy-efficiency retrofits (Chapter I, Characteristic 5) 
will lower household expenditures by reducing consumption 
of both resources, leading to household cost savings. If the 
residential retrofitting goals outlined by the Chicago Climate 
Action Plan are achieved, the cost savings could amount to 
an average of as much as $544 annually per household.347   
While there is no guarantee that household savings will be redi-
rected into productive economic activity, both of these impacts are 
likely to strengthen the regional economy.
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C. Enhanced Quality-of-Life Amenities
 
Several GO TO 2040 recommendations will improve residents’ 
quality of life through improved livability — attention to community 
character, aesthetics, accessibility and environmental sustainabil-
ity — and enhancement of various public goods amenities (Chapter 
I, Characteristics 1, 2 and 5). While the most important factor in 
attracting and retaining skilled workers is the quality of employment 
opportunities, quality of life and amenities also play a significant 
role, in the attraction of firms as well. Tolley et al, for example, find 
support for the notion that individual’s “sense of place” — including 
both physical and cultural amenities such as attributes of infrastruc-
ture and social networking opportunities — play a role in influenc-
ing labor supply and regional economic growth.348 Among CMAP’s 
recommendations, four will serve to make the region’s communities 
more livable, thereby indirectly influencing economic growth.
 (i)  Achieve Greater Livability Through Land Use and Housing  
The recommendation to promote mixed-income, mixed-use 
transit-accessible communities (Chapter I, Characteristic 2) 
will help the region attract and retain knowledge economy 
workers. The convenience factor of these communities — 
proximity to employment, schools, retail and services, en-
tertainment and a range of transportation options — makes 
them highly desirable, as demonstrated by households’ 
greater willingness to pay to live in such communities.349 
Walkable communities, and transit-oriented development 
in particular, also help to retain workers through growth 
in property values over time,350 a trend that is expected to 
continue into the future as real estate values over the next 25 
years are predicted to rise most quickly in “smart communi-
ties” that incorporate a mix of residential and commercial 
districts in a “pedestrian friendly configuration.”351 
 (ii)  Manage and Conserve Water and Energy Resources 
GO TO 2040’s recommendation to embrace water conserva-
tion and energy efficiency (Chapter I, Characteristic 5) will 
also serve to increase the region’s attractiveness to knowl-
edge economy workers. “Green” neighborhoods, in which 
infrastructure, policy and incentives foster efficient resource 
utilization, are highly desirable places in which to live, in 
part because of the lower utility costs faced by consumers 
(see B(ii), above). Local governments that mandate green 
residential features may therefore be directly contributing to 




 (iii)  Expand and Improve Parks and Open Space 
The GO TO 2040 recommendation to enhance the region’s 
network of parks and open space (Chapter I, Characteristic 5) 
will make the region more attractive to new workers as well 
as enhance the quality of life of current residents. Aside from 
environmental and health benefits, parks, open space and 
natural features are among the most attractive amenities in 
Northeastern Illinois. An early study on the relationship be-
tween amenities and urban land prices determined that prox-
imity to Lake Michigan — and its surrounding recreational 
open space — was a highly desired characteristic of Chicago 
homes. Accordingly, the value of living one mile closer to the 
Lake was estimated to be $2,219 on a capitalized basis.352   
After improvements to Chicago’s Garfield Park were made in 
1997, the number of “casual” visitors to the park the follow-
ing year nearly doubled — from 15,000 to 40,000.353 Studies 
of the value placed on parks and open space in other metro-
politan areas have echoed these findings.354 
 (iv)  Promote Sustainable Local Food 
The recommendation to support and promote a sustainable, 
local food system (Chapter I, Characteristic 5) will add to the 
region’s ability to attract and retain households and work-
ers.  In addition to the health and environmental benefits, 
sustainable food systems increase community food secu-
rity — an attractive neighborhood feature. By maintaining 
local control over the availability and distribution of food, 
sustainable food systems will likely buffer the region against 
periods of economic insecurity that may disrupt normal food 
flows.355 Research indicates that tighter-knit communities 
often develop as a byproduct of increased local food control: 
relying less on distant agricultural sources solidifies interre-
gional dynamics between producers and consumers, thereby 
increasing community trust and participation.356   
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The increasing dynamism which characterizes the global economy 
means that the economic prosperity that the nation and the Chicago 
region have long enjoyed cannot be taken for granted. The greater 
role of knowledge in all aspects of the economy, and its distinct 
characteristic of generating increasing returns, mean that econo-
mies are diverging. Places that gain and nurture a competitive 
advantage will thrive, while those that remain passive will stagnate 
and be left behind. This is particularly important for regional econo-
mies, as regions have become the key unit of economic geography 
in which these dynamics play out. Given this context, it is more 
important than ever to act strategically and deliberately to foster 
economic growth at the regional level.
Regions that succeed in guiding economic growth develop a deep, 
ongoing capacity to approach their economy as a multi-faceted sys-
tem that is more than the sum of its parts. They profoundly, carefully 
and continually understand and engage to enhance the performance 
of the complex, organic, market mechanisms through which mil-
lions of individuals and firms interact to produce economic growth.  
They are adaptive and nimble, able to adjust quickly to changes in 
the macro or local economic environment. They take an integrated 
approach to economic growth, bridging across traditional silos of 
policy and programmatic activity and, even more importantly, across 
the activities of the public, private and civic sectors. Cross-fertiliza-
tion is facilitated across industries, occupations and functions in the 
private sector, providing rich opportunities for idea exchange and 
innovative collaborations. The culture in economically successful re-
gions is inclusive and open, availing itself of new ideas, people and 
approaches. Highly networked, flexible and adaptive institutional in-
frastructure has become increasingly important to sustained growth 
and development.
In this context, the Chicago region finds itself at an economic 
crossroads. On the one hand, the current status of the regional 
economy is strong. The region successfully made the turn, in the 
‘80s and ‘90s, from a primarily industrial economy to a knowledge- 
and service-based economy. It has high levels of human capital, 
with strong concentrations in information sector industries and 
knowledge based functional clusters — a headquarters region with 
thriving finance, business services, law, IT and emerging bioscience, 
advanced manufacturing and similar high growth activities. It com-
bines multiple deep areas of specialization, providing the resilience 
that comes from economic diversity. It is home to the abundant 
quality-of-life amenities that flow from business and household 
prosperity. It is truly a global region with an economy that leads in 
global competition.
On the other hand, beneath this static portrait of our strengths lie 
some disturbing signs of potential loss of momentum. Trends in 
the last decade reveal slowing rates, compared to other regions, 
of growth in productivity and gross metropolitan product. Current 
levels of innovation, new firm creation, business churn and adapta-
tion and employment are comparably poor. The region also faces 
emerging challenges with respect to both spatial efficiency and the 
governmental environment.357 
In short, the Chicago regional economy has enormous assets on 
which to continue building, but we need to pay attention in order to 
guarantee continued growth and prosperity. To seize this moment, it 
is critical to develop the institutional infrastructure which provides 
the capacity to be deliberate and strategic, enhances flexibility 
and adaptability and fosters open, formal and informal networks, 
especially coordination between the private, public and civic sec-
tors. GO TO 2040 provides a critical roadmap toward continued 
economic growth. As importantly, the process of creating, and now 
of implementing, the plan itself contributes to enhancing this key 
institutional capacity. Much more work needs to be done, but GO 
TO 2040 places the region firmly on the right path and — given the 
region’s enormous economic capacity and potential — shows great 
promise for success.
Conclusion
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6  The recommendations in Chapter 6 (Increase Commitment to Public 
Transit) overlap with this recommendation, by urging investment in 
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from the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching by 
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Prosperity (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Metropolitan 
Policy Program, 2007), 32.
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14 Brookings, The State of Metropolitan America, 17.
15  Unpublished analysis of 2008 data from the Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis by The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program.
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NSF funding and 94% of venture capital investments. Figures are for 
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Oxford University Press, 2000).
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economies of scale necessary to compete in international markets. Yet 
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